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CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN THE PROCESS 
OF “LEBANONIZTION” 
 
Riad Kobaissi 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis tries to trace the effect of Michel Chiha’s ideas about Lebanon in Rafik 
Hariri’s discourse. Chiha is arguably the founder of the 1926 constitution, the 
architect of the Lebanese economy, and the theorist of the Lebanese political system. 
Rafik Hariri, on the other hand, is the Godfather of Ta‘ef Accord signed in 1989 and 
the architect of the reconstruction plan. Two main political figures lived in totally 
different eras, yet still share many similarities. These similarities are mainly derived 
from a shared discourse that links identity to geography. Accordingly, the political 
and economic identity of Lebanon is defined by reference to a geographic conceptual 
frame. In this vein, Lebanon is defined as a haven for minorities whose inhabitants are 
born to be traders. This conceptual frame has been inherited by the political class 
since the formation of Lebanon in 1920. Chiha propagated and theorized for Lebanon 
as a permanent entity for “inter-sharing minorities” and as having a free market 
economy. Hariri adopted this vision of Lebanon after a 15 years civil war. Such a 
relation between Hariri and Chiha might look irrelevant because of their different 
sectarian background. However, this is the main claim of this thesis, which is figuring 
out the role of the same class interest in shaping Chiha’s and Hariri’s discourses. This 
will be achieved by analyzing and comparing the main features of their respective 
discourses, in order to show where the two diverge and converge, and at what points 
they contradict each other, and why? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Inherited Discourse 
“Switzerland of the east” or “the Swiss version of the east”, terminologies 
vary but the context remains the same. Since its inception in 1920 Lebanon has been 
identified as a crossroad between three continents and a haven for minorities. Such 
identification is not a simple detail in the ideological discourse of the political class, 
which has been ruling since Lebanon’s declaration. From Michel Chiha to Rafik 
Hariri, history repeats itself along with its repercussions.    
Identifying Lebanon according to the geographical dimension is driven from 
the literature of Belgian orientalist Father Henri Lammens. He believed that 
geography is the fundamental element that develops the identity of any nation. 
Accordingly, the Lebanese historian Jawad Bolous said that geography creates history 
and history creates politics (Traboulsi, 1999). The notion might look very simple but 
its implications and repercussions are very complex, not to say catastrophic, 
especially when applied on the Lebanese case. According to this “simple” notion, 
since geographic terrains are permanent, the cultural and economic identity of any 
nation is also permanent. Thus, for those who follow this socio-geographic notion, the 
cultural, political and economic identity of Lebanon is permanent, as former Lebanese 
president Camille Chamoun says “Lebanon is immemorial, immortal and eternal”. It’s 
the discourse that has always been used by the political class in order to sustain the 
interests of its members.    
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What is this ″permanent immortal identity″ for the Lebanese nation? 
According to Michel Chiha, one of the founding fathers of the 1926 constitution, 
Lebanon is sea and mountains. It is the sea because the Lebanese were maritime 
merchants who traveled the seas just as their ancestors the Phoenicians, and it is the 
mountain “fortress” that protected the minorities who escaped to it. Hereby, the 
mountains protect the freedom of the sea, and the Lebanese are streamlined as 
merchants and minorities who will always hold this unchangeable identity. This 
implies that Lebanon cannot survive without the confessional and mercantile spirit 
(Chiha 2004).   
Is it important that Chiha believed in such thoughts? Indeed, because as a 
journalist and a banker, he was not just any intellectual of the Lebanese intelligentsia. 
Indeed, because Chiha, the backstage politician, was in the heart of the establishment 
i.e. that core group of families that embodied and protected the interests of the 
“bourgeoisie”. This consortium was mainly formed from twenty four families , nine 
Maronites, seven Greek Catholic, four Greek Orthodox, one Latin, one Protestant, and 
one Armenian, in addition to six Muslim families - four Sunni, one Shi‘ite and one 
Druze.  Accordingly, Chiha’s influence played an important role in shaping the 
economic, political and ideological infrastructure of the Lebanese nation-state. One of 
the ways to prove the continuity of Chiha’s discourse is by tracing the influence he 
left on the political discourse and experience of influential political figures. In this 
case Rafik Hariri is a perfect example.   
Chiha’s Discourse had a great impact on the former prime minister of Lebanon 
Rafic Hariri, The godfather of “Ta’ef” Accord which established the second republic 
since the independence through a series of constitutional amendments. Although 
Hariri’s confessional and sectarian belonging was different from Chiha’s, the Muslim 
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Sunni billionaire was influenced by the Christian Kaldian Catholic banker and 
journalist.  
This is the precise focus and scope of the topic that I will tackle in this thesis, 
pointing out series of proofs that establish the relation between the Lebanese 
nationalist Michel Chiha and former Arab nationalist Rafik Hariri.  
Such a target can be achieved by closely inspecting the empirical experiences 
of these two Lebanese politicians who stood in the core of the “Consortium”, in  
different times.  Proving the strong relation between the thoughts and practices of 
Chiha and Hariri, especially the economic ones, is important to unveil the main 
reasons that produce and renew the elements of the Lebanese crises. This hypothesis 
relies fundamentally on the roles fulfilled by these two main figures: Chiha was 
mainly the architect of the Lebanese economy and the theorist of the political system, 
while Hariri was the cornerstone of Beirut’s reconstruction plan after decades of civil 
war. Both of them had a great impact on the political discourse and economic   
methodology applied during their lifetimes and following their deaths. Both of them, 
despite the differences between their political and administrative positions, pushed for 
adopting economic plans that were directly driven from what Fawaz Traboulsi calls 
“Geographic determinism” or “Geographism1”, whereas as mentioned above the 
economic and cultural identity is affected by geography.  
1.2 Tracing “Chihism” in “Harirism” 
The main questions that this study attempts to answer are: is there any relation 
between Chiha’s intellectual system and Hariri’s experience in governance? Were the 
economic choices of Rafik Hariri influenced by the ideological discourse established 
by Michel Chiha in the early 20th century? How was Hariri, who belongs to a 
                                                 
1 Referring to Historicism as “Historical Determinism” 
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confessional majority in the Arab world, able to adapt Chiha’s discourse which is 
saturated and motivated by the fears of the minorities? Was Hariri able to 
“Lebanonize” the Sunni sect by transforming it into a minority that associates itself 
with other minorities, or were his motives directed towards protecting the interest of 
the bourgeoisie despite any sectarian dimension?  
To answer these questions, the study will examine how Chiha’s discourse 
moved from the theoretical field to the empirical field. On the other hand, the study 
will examine how Hariri’s empirical experience was demonstrated theoretically. Such 
an examination will be achieved through presenting their thoughts and experiences as 
follows: Chiha and Hariri’s identification with Lebanon and its role in the region and 
the world, their stance from tying Lebanon to the western alliances, their stance from 
sectarianism and its institutions, the role of the government and parliament, and 
finally and most importantly their economic vision.  
Nevertheless, there is not enough literature that we can rely on to prove any 
correlation between Chiha and Hariri political thoughts and experiences, hence a 
proof that “geographic determinism” was the ideological tool used by Hariri to sustain 
Chiha’s approach. There is no literature that compares between Chiha and Hariri, one 
can barely find some hints that point to the similarities or the differences between 
these political and economic figures. However, the literature will be useful for this 
study to derive the major elements and features of the discourses and actions adopted 
and implemented by both men.  
Accordingly, the main assessment for this thesis in the literature of Chiha and 
Hariri will be by correlating their thoughts. That might look irrelevant even for the 
closest member of Hariri's inner circle. Thereby, the thesis will focus on the 
similarities and differences between the two political figures in order to prove the 
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persistence of Chiha’s “intellect system” despite the different sectarian belonging of 
the latter, arguing whether this ideological discourse that serves the interests of the 
bourgeoisie is responsible for repeating Lebanon’s modern history.   
 
1.3 “Chihism” Literature 
The vast majority of Chiha’s literature is reflected in books and articles written 
by the banker journalist himself, through which he draws his definition to the 
Lebanese identity culturally and economically. Chiha believes that the Lebanese are a 
combination of Mediterranean mixtures; he identifies Lebanon’s sectarian 
communities as “spiritual families” and “associated minorities” that can resolve their 
conflicts in the parliament. He describes this as an "invented and special kind" of 
federalism. Chiha’s hypothetical definition is an inevitable fact based on a dual 
geographic identification:  Lebanon is the crossroad between three continents 
(Europe, Asia, and Africa), Lebanon is the sea and mountain (Chiha, 2004).  
The Lebanese economy can only be based on a free market because Lebanon 
lacks raw material while trading is imprinted in the identity of the Lebanese people 
who cannot be effective in the productive sector. Hereby, Chiha deduces that the 
Lebanese economic structure is not similar to any other. It’s an economy that 
regulates its economic balance with what Chiha dubs the “acrobatics” [English for al-
bahlawaniat]. His conclusion is built on the Lebanese merchants’ smartness and the 
Lebanese immigrants revenues. Accordingly, Chiha, who praises the immigration 
describing it as "pervasion", preaches for an economy-based on trade, services and 
construction. He believed that “when it will flourish everything will flourish”. Hence, 
he stands against taxation especially when it comes to imported products. On the other 
hand, he does not show enthusiasm to the industrial sector, arguing that the 
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substantiality of the Lebanese economy is derived from the substantiality of its 
monetary system (Chiha, 1965). 
This universalism and uniqueness leads the Lebanese banker to two 
fundamental principals: First, Lebanon’s independence will always be imperfect and 
particular. Second, Lebanon should always ally itself with the forces controlling or 
trying to control the region and the world (Chiha, 1962). Chiha’s definition for 
Lebanon and its role has been illustrated and criticized by some scholars. Fawaz 
Traboulsi examines Chiha’s “intellectual system” unveiling its ideological 
infrastructure, pointing out to its contradictions, especially between economic   
liberalism and social conservatism, mainly sectarianism, questioning its feasibility 
and arguing about its impact on the Lebanese political system and its role in 
reproducing the Lebanese crises. The leftist scholar sparks the main argument of this 
thesis arguing that those who tried to repeat Chiha’s thoughts, in completely different 
circumstances, ended up repeating the beginnings in a flat and shallow manner 
(Traboulsi, 1999). Traboulsi’s conclusion intersects with the query raised by Kamal 
Dib who asks whether Hariri was the "last" Lebanese merchant, a question that stands 
in the core of this study. The economic expert demonstrates the modern history of 
Lebanon arguing the role of the warlords and the merchants in shaping the Lebanese 
history. He exposes Chiha’s influence on the establishment of the “merchants' 
republic”, and approaches Hariri economic  plan from a critical point of view (Dib, 
2007). 
Chiha’s foreign policy approach is demonstrated mainly in his position from 
Lebanon’s independence and the establishment of Israel on the land of Palestine.  
Although he was one of the toughest critics of Israel describing it as Lebanon’s 
problem, Chiha never gave up his commitment to the western alliances (Chiha, 1960). 
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He used to believe that protecting Lebanon can only be achieved through joining the 
military alliances and agreements of the west, especially that he had always expressed 
his loathe of communism (Chiha, 1997).  
 
1.4 “Harirism” Literature 
When it comes to Hariri, excluding few works, the vast majority of literature 
is mostly driven from books and articles written on his governance and reconstruction 
plan, which was only written after his assassination with a massive car bomb. Thus, 
most of the books tend to glorify Hariri the politician and the model portraying him as 
an idol to follow. He is the poor young man who was not able to complete his 
undergraduate degree because of his economic problems. He was the modest Arab 
nationalist who travelled to Saudi Arabia in search of a better life and returned to 
Lebanon with dual nationality as a Lebanese-Saudi billionaire. By employing his 
cash, resources, and goodwill he was able to implement governmental plans as prime 
minister and reconstruct Lebanon (Iskandar, 2007). 
The vast majority of Hariri’s literature has a venerative nature, portraying him 
as a sacred political figure, something that doesn’t support the precise focus of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, certain information and narrations extracted from the testimonies 
of Hariri advisors or close friends can still be useful to substantiate the comparative 
analysis the thesis is trying to build. Thus, Goerge Bkassini, the chief in editor of Al-
Mustaqbal newspaper owned by Hariri, will unveil the hidden political agenda of the 
assassinated prime minister through quotes from Hariri’s inner circle. For instance the 
former Intelligence Bureau officer Johnny Abdo states that Hariri was planning to 
take Lebanon’s independence from Syria quietly and subtly by pressuring the 
international community to force an end to the Israeli occupation, in order to assure 
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that a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon will not turn into Syria’s defeat (Bkassini, 
2009). Furthermore, Syrian Hegemony is described as a political void and blamed for 
the waste and corruption during Hariri’s governments. This illegal expenditure 
benefited the Syrian regime with an average of five billion US dollars between 1990 
and 2005. Accordingly, “Hariri came to power with a vision for governance”, but this 
vision collided with the political elite (Shalaq, 2006).  
Such testimonies will be useful for the perused comparison between Chiha and 
Hariri, since it will answer some of the research questions that have to do with 
Hariri’s vision of Lebanon, in addition to his relation with the political class. While 
the economical plan is masterfully demonstrated by the economic expert Marwan 
Iskandar (Iskandar, 2007) the only book written by Hariri himself (1992-1998), is the 
indicator that reflects his economic vision that supports individual initiative, free 
mobility of capital, legislative and tax stability, banking secrecy laws and a free and 
liberal market economy (Hariri, 1999).  Economical elements are considered to be the 
fundamental commandments in the Hariri bible which we can also from his archived 
ministerial papers, statements, speeches and interviews  
Critical writings about Hariri are many and mostly a mix of opinions and facts. 
“Al Ayadi al soud” (English for The Black Hands) of former deputy Najah Wakim is 
an example. It was considered to be part of the campaign launched against Hariri by 
the security regime. Nevertheless, we can still benefit from the information supported 
in this book, especially if we discounted the subjective information. Hereby, we can 
rely on the documented facts that unearthed the corruption during Hariri’s first 
mandate from 1992 till 1998. It reveals how contracts and administrative positions 
were distributed proportionally between the three presidents.  For example more than 
58% of the governmental contracts awarded were consensual between the contractors 
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and the various ministries (Wakim, 1998). George Corm, the economic expert and 
also former minister of finance in the government that succeeded Hariri’s first 
mandate, criticized the fiscal policy adopted by Hariri that depended on taking loans 
with high interest rates from the local banks (Corm, 1996).    
 
1.5 Methodology 
The research design is based on critical analysis and comparative analysis. The 
study attempts to demonstrate and analyze the discourse of both Chiha and Hariri and 
then will compare both discourses depending on the results produced by the analysis. 
The primary sources are the literature written by both Hariri and Chiha themselves. 
The secondary sources are books and articles written about them. However, as 
mentioned above there is not enough literature that answers directly the questions 
raised by the research, which has to do with the correlation between Chiha and Hariri. 
Therefore, a substantial portion of the research will be allotted to the features deduced 
from the analysis of the primary recourses. In accordance, Hariri’s ministerial papers 
and plans as well as Chiha’s writings will be dissected and analyzed, to define the 
main features of their political and economic discourses. But first, the research will 
present the main events in Hariri and Chiha’s careers in order to situate their 
discourses in a clear political timeline. This is important and indispensable to the 
process of the analysis, especially since understanding their thoughts cannot be 
achieved if not synchronized with the timeline.  
In order to have a clear vision of Hariri discourse, personal interviews with his 
political and economic advisors were necessary. This included interviewing Fouad 
Siniora, the former prime minister, who is considered to be the right hand of Hariri, 
Nohad mashnok, a deputy, was his political advisor in the nineties before he was 
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exiled by Hariri himself due to  a request from the Syrian authorities,  Al Fadel Shalak 
, whowas the head of the Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Hariri 
Foundation as well as a minister for telecom, Ghazi Yousef , a deputy and economic 
advisor, Dawood Al Sayiegh, a political advisor mainly specialized in the relation 
between Hariri and the Maronite patriarch, Radwan Al Sayed, a cultural advisor 
mainly Islamic issues. However, only few advisors responded positively to the 
research request. Most of them either rejected or eluded by postponing the interview 
and then closing their phones. The only two who were cooperative were Yousef and 
Al Sayiegh, yet the outcome results of their interviews were not of a great use. Yousef 
was very subjective while answering the question on Hariri’s defect to the Syrian 
aspect.  
Hence, it was very difficult to come out with scientific information. Al 
Sayiegh’s interview was different in the sense that he was arguing scientifically, yet 
he decided after a few questions to stop the interview because the questions are 
complicated and cannot be answered in a personal interview. Thus, he suggested 
relying on a number of his books and a booklet that demonstrated the political and 
economic vision of Tayyar al Moustaqbal, Hariri’s political party, which was written 
by Hariri himself with his political and economic advisors, as Al Sayiegh mentioned. 
This booklet is saturated with keywords that contribute in substantiating the main 
argument of this thesis. 
 
1.6 Map of the Thesis 
The thesis will consist of six chapters. Chapter one will address the topic and 
its precise focus, explaining the reasons that stand behind choosing it, and its 
importance in the field of study. Chapter two will demonstrate the political biography 
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of Chiha, pointing out to the main incidents in his life. Chapter three will demonstrate 
the political biography of Hariri pointing out to the main incidents in his life. Chapter 
four will examine Chiha’s thoughts and experiences and will aim to unveil the 
ideological discourse that stood behind his economic and political approach. Chapter 
five will go through the same principles of chapter four while being applied on Hariri. 
Chapter Six will compare between Hariri and other political figures, then it will go on 
to do the same between Chiha and Hariri based on the facts and analysis of the former 
chapters.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHIHA’S POLITICAL BIOGRPHY 
 
Michel Chiha was born in 1891 in the Lebanese town of Bmekkine in the 
mountainous district of Aley, to two of the most prominent bourgeois families in 
Lebanon, Chiha and Pharaon.  Both families rose in the mid-19th century when the 
feudal system started to decline and the silk exports prospered.   
The Chihas were a reputable Iraqi family who moved to Lebanon in the 
beginning of the 19th century and intermarried with the Pharaon family.  The 
Pharaons, originally from Egypt, were a Catholic family that used to live in Damascus 
and were known to trade livestock within Syria, between Damascus and Houran 
(Chiha foundation website).  The Egyptian branch of this family achieved success 
after Antoine Pharaon was appointed as manager of the customs. Later on, he started 
lending money to Mamluk leaders in Egypt. The family eventually settled in Lebanon 
and worked in the financial and commercial field such as the export of silk which was 
the origin of the Chihas banking business as early as the 1870s when raw silk prices 
were rising drastically.  Antoine Pharaon and his uncle, Ruphael Chiha, stored and 
traded raw silk, achieving huge profits that enabled them to establish Bank Pharaon 
and Chiha. (Traboulsi, 1999, 16-17)  
Michel Chiha pursued his primary and secondary studies at the "Jesuite 
Fathers” college, and received his college degree from the University of Saint Joseph 
in Beirut. After graduation, he travelled to Manchester in England where he studied 
English and Economics. In 1907, Chiha returned to Beirut to join his maternal uncles, 
the Pharaons, to work in the bank that his father had founded in 1876. He soon 
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became the bank manager and occupied this position until his death. (Chiha 
Foundation Website)2  
2.1 Political Background 
 
With the eruption of World War I, Chiha departed to Cairo to escape the 
mandatory military service. In Cairo, he studied law and began his political activity 
with the Lebanese exiles, including Bechara El Khoury and Lebanese poet Hector 
Khalat. Chiha was a supporter of the Lebanese Current which was divided into two 
groups: one that was seeking the independence of Mount Lebanon as a smaller-
Lebanon under foreign protection, and another that was demanding the independence 
of a Greater Lebanon.   
At the end of World War I, Lebanese delegations with different interests took 
part in the San Remo Conference that determined the allocation of Class "A” League 
of Nations mandates.  Each delegation had different interests - some requested that 
Lebanon unites with Syria under the Kingdom of Al Faisaliah while others advocated 
for a Federal union with Syria.  A third group, which Chiha supported, demanded 
Lebanon’s independence. This group represented the "Young Phoenicians,” 
influenced by the ideas of Youssef Al-Sawda, the man who called for the expansion 
of Lebanon to its "natural borders.”  However, Chiha disagreed with some of Al-
Sawda’s comrades who refused the French protection in the "Young Phoenicians” 
Club.  Al-Sawda believed this protection would not benefit anyone but a minority of 
what he called "position seekers among Lebanese people and a bunch of French 
greedy monopolizing capitalists". (Sawda 1976, 204-205).  
                                                 
2 Michel Chiha Biography, Michel Chiha Foundation website. Retrieved from 
http://www.michelchiha.org/biographies.asp?mn=1 
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The Mikkine boy turned into one of the strongest enthusiasts to proclaim the 
state of Greater Lebanon under the shadow of the French mandate in July 1920. 
Accordingly, he founded the Progress Party (Hizb al-Taraqy) with a number of 
personalities who supported France. The Party’s slogan was “For the sake of Lebanon 
with France”, and the leaders of this party were limited to Maronites and Catholics, so 
as to embody the alliance of Beirut’s commercial and financial bourgeoisie, with new 
viewpoints coming from the mountain. The faction simultaneously brought together 
representatives of two main political groups who fought against one another- Emile 
Edde and Michel Chiha (Traboulsi, 1999, 22).  
The enthusiast of the French mandate succeeded at establishing a strong 
relationship with the High Commissioner, General Henri Gouraud, through 
consolidating with his main assistant,Robert De Caix. De Caix was the one who made 
it possible for Chiha to actively work in setting the laws of the new Lebanese state 
and its institutions. Michel’s long conversations with Robert greatly influenced 
drawing the borders of the Lebanese state that Chiha insisted on. On the other hand, 
Emile Edde corresponded with the French more than once about preventing the 
expansion of Lebanon to its proclaimed borders, thus preserving the demographic 
supremacy of Christians (Traboulsi 2007, 137). 
 
2.2 French Mandate Era 
Michel Chiha continued his intellectual and cultural activity in the "Revue 
Phénicienne” that the Young Phoenicians had founded before the war. They re-issued 
the magazine during the French mandate. Hence, Chiha did not settle for just being a 
bank manager.  He decided to nominate himself for the 1925 parliamentary elections 
with the encouragement of his friend Omar Al Daouk.  Although his relationship with 
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High Commissioner Maurice Sarrail was deteriorating since he opposed Chiha’s 
nomination, Michel was elected as a Beirut minority seat deputy, defeating Ayoub 
Tabet. (Michel Chiha foundation)3  
The new Deputy reconsolidated his relationship with the French after the 
departure of Maurice Sarrail, crowning his parliamentary experience by becoming a 
member in the committee that drafted the constitution. This committee also included 
Petro Trad and Shibl Dammus. The majority of Muslims boycotted this committee, 
but Chiha’s friend Omar Al Daouk, who was a member of this committee, refused to 
recognize Greater Lebanon. (Traboulsi 1999, 33) 
Chiha’s activities as deputy exceeded the political and constitutional levels, 
embracing the economic frame and revealing his economic vision. He served as 
president of the parliamentary Finance Committee, calling for the removal of all 
barriers that pose an obstacle to commerce.  He opposed taxes on revenues, fought the 
increase in custom fees, and demanded setting legislations that encourage the 
establishment of companies with Lebanese capital, in order to alleviate the tax 
burdens on the Lebanese traders resulting from taxes joint stock companies pay in 
their countries of origin. In brief, Chiha worked against everything that encouraged 
production so long as it was at the expense of commercial exchange freedom. 
(Traboulsi 1999, 24-25)  
Chiha quit the parliament in 1929 and devoted his time to trading and banking 
affairs while practicing a different kind of political power. Journalist Eskandar Riachi 
accused him of using Pharaon and Chiha Banking finances to fund electoral 
                                                 
3 Michel Chiha Biography, Michel Chiha Foundation website. Retrieved from 
http://www.michelchiha.org/biographies.asp?mn=1 
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campaigns to appoint three quarters of the parliament.  In addition to this, 24 deputies 
used to get remunerated "directly" from the bank (Traboulsi 1999, 28)  
Chiha’s power on the political arena developed mainly after the break-up of 
the Phoenician Group following the 1933 presidential elections.  The elections 
divided them into two main political blocs: the Constitutional bloc that was led by 
Bechara Al-Khoury, and the Patriotic bloc that was led by Emile Edde.  These 
elections allowed for a Muslim candidate, Sheikh Mohamed Al Jesr to win, causing 
the mandate authority to suspend the constitution and appoint Habib Basha Al Saad as 
president.  In turn, Bechara El Khoury and his Constitutional bloc demanded that the 
constitution be respected and made an agreement with France to replace the mandate. 
Accordingly, Chiha established "Le Jour” newspaper in 1934, in order to voice the 
idea of a new political viewpoint, appointing his friend Charles Hillou as editor-in-
chief (Hillou 1995, 60-72).  
In the beginning of 1936, Emile Edde won against Chiha’s friend Bechara El 
Khoury. He was elected as president and signed a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation, in addition to a military agreement with France. Chiha did not believe 
this agreement would enhance Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence since the 
independence was already achieved upon the proclamation of the state of Greater 
Lebanon in 1920. However, he continued to support the agreement as long as France 
committed to protect Lebanon with the French forces being kept on Lebanese 
territories for an additional quarter of a century (Chiha1957, 20-25).  
 
2.3 Road to Independence 
 
With the eruption of World War II, Chiha refused to align with one 
international camp against another, in objection to what he called "the alliance against 
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nature" between the Western democratic forces and the Soviet Union facing the Axis 
countries. He took this stance mainly because of his enmity towards communism, 
which he considered to pose a danger tp Lebanon, the region and the world 
(Chiha1997, 87).  
As Bechara El Khoury was elected president in 1943, Michel Chiha 
powerfully entered the world of the executive authority by becoming one of his main 
consultants. Nevertheless, El Khoury’s presidential mandate neither began nor ended 
as Chiha wished. He was neither excited to announce Lebanon’s independence from 
France nor was he supportive of the renewal of El Khoury’s presidential mandate 
through the constitutional amendment passed to achieve it.  
Chiha did not support the election of Riad Al Solh to prime minister either.  
Since Al Solh was a traditional ally of Edde, Michel preferred Abdel Hamid Karame, 
a former Pharaon family ally instead. Chiha was also not too excited about the 
National Pact either, especially with respect to the Arab facet of Lebanon and the 
commitment that Lebanon would neither be a passage nor a permanent stop for 
colonization. Chiha even chose impartiality upon the outburst of the crisis between 
those supporting the independence and those who supported the mandate. He 
announced that it is the right of the Lebanese authority to modify the constitution. 
However, it is also the right of the mandate authority to show reticence towards this 
because the Lebanese constitution is not similar to the French one so that it could be 
amended by one party (Chiha 1957, 38-39). 
 
2.4 Bshara El Khoury Era 
In spite of the difference in opinions about Lebanon and its role, Chiha 
succeeded in passing many of his political and economic ideas during Bechara El 
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Khoury’s mandate. He soon convinced El Khoury to replace Riad Al Solh with Abdel 
Hamid Karame and afterwards with Sami Al Solh. Accordingly, he continued to 
expand his economic power by promoting laws that were related to the freedom of 
commercial exchange and by resisting protection of the customs that the 
manufacturers were asking for. His biggest contribution to commerce was the idea of 
the Lebanese currency’s gold coverage. (Traboulsi 1999, 29) 
Basically, Chiha had a big role in separating both the Lebanese currency and 
economy from Syria. After he firmly called for this separation in 1945, he refused to 
discuss the possibility of an economic union with Syria without considering the 
economic separation a "suicidal" step. He said: "if the choice was between freedom 
and death, we would choose freedom". (Chiha 1965, 129-147).  
The Arabs’ setback upon the announcement of the state of Israel in 1948 
formed a prominent event in Michel Chiha’s calendar. He was the one to write most 
about Zionism and its dangers, unlike many of his former companions of the Young 
Phoenicians’ club.  They found the National Jewish Project to be similar to their 
project, which called for a nationalistic Christian country (Traboulsi 1999, 264) 
Chiha worked on removing all the moral excuses that the West gave to justify 
the rise of the state of Israel. He considered the Jewish entity the opposite of the 
Lebanese system, in terms of participating minorities. He also believed that this entity 
forms a great danger to the economy of Lebanon in the first place.  Chiha’s choices to 
find solutions to the Palestinian dilemma did not divert him away from his ideological 
convictions that were necessary to seek foreign protection.   
What distinguished Chiha from Bechara El Khoury though, was his view on 
the Union for the Mediterranean Common Defense League. While Chiha insisted on 
joining this league to curb the Israeli expansionary ambitions, El Khoury refused this 
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union as it contradicted with the Lebanese National Pact.  He also made local 
exceptions related to the Muslims’ refusal of this alliance, as well as Arab exceptions 
related to the Arab Israeli conflict. (Traboulsi 1999, 31) 
In 1949, El Khoury worked on renewing his mandate. Chiha held on to his 
belief that the constitution must not be tampered with and opposed the renewal.  He 
pleaded to the deputies who were close to him to vote against amending the 
constitution, resulting in great tensions between him and El Khoury, but without 
preventing him from being present at the Lebanese president’s office before the 
announcement of his resignation in 1952 in response to strikes and protests. 
(Traboulsi, 1999, 31) 
On the 28th of December in 1954, Michel Chiha passed away but not before he 
was reassured that the country is following his vision that he had worked on instilling 
throughout his years of political and economic activity. Politically, Chiha took part in 
electing Camille Chamoun as president, having announced that he would support the 
president who commits to forming alliances with Western countries. On the other 
hand, it is enough to say that the separation of customs from Syria was one of Chiha’s 
major economic achievements a year before his demise.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
HARIRI’S POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 
 
Rafik Hariri was born on the 1st of November 1944 in the southern 
Lebanese city of Sidon to a modest family of five members.  His father, Baha El 
Deen, was the sole household provider as a farmer, hereby, tracing the billionaire’s 
wealth back to the farmland.  During summer vacations, Rafik used to help his father 
harvest crops in the agricultural fields of south Lebanon.  Upon completing high 
school, he travelled to Egypt then returned to Lebanon to attend Beirut Arab 
University.  Throughout his educational experience, he followed Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s ideas which eventually swayed him into supportingthe Arab Nationalist 
Movement, never hesitating in participating in its demonstrations (Bkassini 2009, 
p.22).  To pay his university fees, Hariri worked as an accountant during the day and 
an editor at night, manning two shifts at Dar Al Sayyad.  The 25-year old did not 
hesitate to leave his university studies and take the chance of travelling to Saudi 
Arabia to try out a teaching job he had learned about from a newspaper.   
 
3.1 Origins of wealth 
In 1965, Hariri accepted the job and moved to Saudi Arabia to work as a high 
school teacher. However, he soon landed another job as an accountant for Nicolas Issa 
Makkawi. Since the ambitious Lebanese was a supporter of Abdel Nasser, he avoided 
participating in any political activity in the Arabian Peninsula bearing in mind the 
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significance of the situation when "Jamal Abdel Nasser used to provoke problems in 
Yemen and call tfor the overthrow of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia".    
In early 1969, Hariri was able to establish his first real estate company called 
"Ciconest," paving the way for his journey of his quest for the first million, which was 
reached by 1974.  The million doubled, tripled, and quadrupled in what Hariri 
described as a ‘recipe’ that combined both high morals and intelligence.   According 
to his reports, he was offered 500 million Saudi Riyals, and he had the opportunity to 
engender profits that reached up to 200 million Saudi Riyals.  However, he chose to 
settle for only 50 million in return for a well-executed project that would ensure him a 
good reputation and would earn him additional projects.   
This recipe wasn’t Hariri’s only way to wealth as many factors played a role in 
his money-gathering journey. The main factor was the rise in the price of oil in the 
early seventies, resulting in huge profits that were invested in the construction sector. 
In addition to the large sums of money, Hariri received royal patronage, contributing 
greatly to his success.  It all culminated towards the end of 1976 when Hariri’s 
partner, a contractor, won a bid to build a huge hotel in Ta’ef, provided that this 
project gets executed in ten months, which is what indeed had happened. (Iskandar 
2007, 43) 
Hariri was able complete Ta’ef project within the assigned timeframe after 
obtaining a huge financial loan and partnering-up with a French company.  This 
helped him gain the support and trust of Crown Prince Fahed, who became king later 
on in 1980.  It is enough to say that the projects that Saudi Arabia contracted to Hariri 
between the years 1977 and 1982 exceeded 10 billion dollars, making it possible for 
him to buy "Oger" company, when it was on the verge of bankruptcy. (Iskandar 2007, 
44) 
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3.2 The Road to “Ta’ef” Accord 
The road from Ta’ef construction project to Ta’ef political agreement had 
witnessed the birth of the political journey for Rafic Hariri. Journalist Georges 
Bkassini wrote that when the Israeli forces invaded the Lebanese territories, starting 
from the south and reaching Beirut, Hariri was participating in resistance activities. 
Between 1983 and 1985, he formed a resistance unit in collaboration with his friend 
Mahmoud Kokash and two other anonymous people. The number of members of this 
unit reached around 100.  Soon after, nine of them were martyred and one was held in 
captivity. Hariri later negotiated his release with the Israeli side and freed him in the 
nineties. (Bkassini 2009, 24) 
As opposed to Bkassini’s story, other cases placed Hariri on the other side 
of the spectrum. For instance, Former Deputy Najah Wakim talked about the role that 
Hariri’s real estate company played in removing piles of rubbles out of Israeli tanks 
way (Wakim 1998. p.7).  Moreover, Hariri was supposedly nominated to become the 
first prime minister during the mandate of Bashir Gemayel, a plan that failed with the 
latter's assassination (Dib 2007 534).  
Yet again, different versions of the story were told by people close to Hariri. 
On the one hand, Hariri was nominated as Vice-President of the Economic and Social 
Council during the mandate of President Amin Gemayel. However, Hariri refused the 
nomination to escape dragging himself into a network of friendships with Gemayel 
and his commitments. On the contrary, he participated in breaking down Gemayel’s 
May 17th agreement, through his international relations (Bkassini 2009, 20). On the 
other hand, Rafik responded to Gemayel’s plea and asked for King Fahed’s help in 
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eliminating the war damage that resulted from the Civil and Israeli wars in downtown 
Beirut. (Iskandar 2007, 47) 
Regardless of the accuracy of these stories and the roles that Hariri played 
during and after the Israeli invasion, the idea that remains certain is the reconstruction 
of downtown Beirut that was launched during that period, witnessing Hariri’s true 
birth as a politician working behind the scenes.   
Between 1983 and 1988, Hariri established solid relationships with some 
prominent Lebanese diplomats, including Johnny Abdo, the former chief of the 
Lebanese Military Intelligence who engineered, along with the Israelis, the 
mechanism of leading Bashir Al-Gemayel to the presidency. Hariri also succeeded in 
forming a friendship with Abdel Halim Khaddam, who was the Syrian foreign affairs 
minister back then, as well as Hekmat Al-Shehaby, who was the chief of staff of the 
Syrian army (Iskandar 2007, 50-51).  
However, Rafik’s most important role was participating in both, the 
Lausanne and Geneva conferences in the years 1983-1984, to end the Civil War in 
Lebanon. Hariri participated as a representative of the Saudi delegation after he was 
appointed as the assistant of Prince Bandar Ben Sultan, and Prince Saoud Al Faisal 
during both conferences. (Bkassini 2009, 20) This participation was a clear sign that 
Hariri would obtain Saudi nationality, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia does not 
allow dual citizenship.  
With the Civil War reaching an end, Hariri entered the political arena in a 
more serious manner, relying on the fact that he was the ‘Godfather’ of Ta’ef 
agreement signed in 1989 in the Congress Palace that he himself  had built.  Some 
people go as far as saying that the man himself constructed the agreement from 
beginning to end (Iskandar 2007, 51). He was the one to move around between all the 
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parties, holding a "suitcase" that contained all plans and solutions. At the end, the 
Syrians approved the agreement, but only after Hariri’s health suffered to the extent 
that he had to call his private doctor at times for his rising blood pressure (Bkassini 
2007, 29).  
The stories remain unclear, especially since more than one person attributes 
the merit of drafting the agreement to himself. The list goes on, starting with Former 
Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party George Hawi, the leader of the 
Nationalist Movement Albert Mansour, and finally, the member of the Lebanese 
Social Democratic (Phalange) Party Edmond Rizk. However, it remains certain that 
Hariri, who enjoyed great Saudi influence, was an essential lever to this domestic yet 
internationally significant agreement. The Accord affirmed that Lebanon is a definite 
country with an Arab identity, stripping away some of the powers of the President of 
the Republic and granting it to the Cabinet of Ministers. It was no wonder then that 
the name of Hariri was suggested as the first prime minister during the mandate of 
Late President René Mouawad as well, yet the Syrian authorities refused such 
proposals.  Afterwards, Mouawad was assassinated in an explosion. To this day, the 
speculations of his assassination have not faded away. (Bkassini 2009, 30)  
Nevertheless, some say that the decision-makers in Saudi Arabia did not show strong 
enthusiasm to Hariri’s participation in politics in such a direct manner. King Fahed 
asked Hariri to return back to Saudi Arabia directly after completing Ta’ef Accord 
(Bkassini 2009, 34).  
 
3.3 The Road to the Governmental Palace 
Elias Hrawi was elected Lebanese president and the Lebanese government 
was split into two functioning parts; one was civilian under the leadership of Salim El 
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Hoss, and the other one was a military under the leadership of Army General Michel 
Aoun, who refused to surrender Baabda’s Presidential Palace.  Hariri worked on 
securing the residence of President Hrawi in two modern buildings near the main 
headquarters of the Syrian Intelligence in Beau Rivage till 1993. Hariri has even 
ensured covering Hrawi’s expenses, in terms of employees’ salaries, the residence, 
supplies, telecommunications, armored cars and security equipment. This support 
lasted through the first half of Hrawi’s mandate which was later extended until 1998 
(Iskandar 2007, 62).   
In 1991, Omar Karami became prime minister, coinciding with some 
regional events, most prominent of which the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which lead the 
United States to form a large alliance in order to liberate Kuwait, thereby attacking 
Iraq.  Damascus was also a part of this alliance through a symbolic, yet geopolitically 
highly significant military participation. This has overlapped with the Middle East 
Peace Conference of Madrid, at which Beirut and Damascus participated. By that 
time, all the facts lined up with what Rafik Hariri aspired for. He was convinced that 
Ta’ef would not succeed unless it advocated a peace treaty with Israel, whereas he 
used to ask how Israel would retreat without a peace agreement. (Bkassini 2009, 42-
43).  Hariri expressed these convictions later.  His first political speech was delivered 
at the American University of Beirut graduation ceremony in June of 1991, where he 
admitted that Ta’ef agreement had not yet been applied, and that all the sects are 
invited to support the legitimate authority to build a better future (Iskandar 2007, 80).   
At that time, the country was witnessing remarkable economic prosperity 
due to external transfers and governmental revenues. Lebanon witnessed a growth rate 
that reached up to 37% before the decision was taken by the parliament to ratify an 
increase in salaries for government employees by 60%, with a retroactive effect going 
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back to the beginning of 1991. This issue led to the precipitation of people to buy US 
dollars, as such leading to a dramatic fall of the Lebanese currency against the 
American dollar within three weeks. As a result, the Central Bank declared, for the 
first time ever, that it would not support the Lebanese currency. Thisresulted in an 
immense economic decline.. (Iskandar 2007, 62) 
The severe economic collapse was accompanied by demonstrations that 
have been organized in order to protest against price rise. The black smoke billowed 
in the skies of Beirut, and the government of Karami collapsed. Afterwards, Rashid 
Al-Solh was appointed as prime minister having a mission of holding elections that 
were largely boycotted by Christians.  
 
3.4 Hariri’s First Mandate (1992-1998) 
The nomination of Hariri as prime minister was affirmed in July of 1992. 
As a consequence, the economy witnessed a gradual improvement and the Lebanese 
currency recovered.  As such, Hariri announced the formation of his government on 
the 2nd of November 1992.  He presented himself to the Lebanese people as the 
economic saviour who was to work on reestablishing the economic role of Lebanon 
before the Civil War. 
Hariri entered the Lebanese government armed with a fortune that exceeded 
one billion dollars in real estates and projects in Paris, Washington, London and 
Lebanon.  He also enjoyed a good reputation being the philanthropist who offered 
scholarships to more than 35,000 students from different confessions. The most 
important of his contributions was his continuous support of the Lebanese Army 
during its darkest days of General Michel Aoun Era, whereby he transferred 
approximately half-a-million dollars. (Iskandar 2007, 58-60)   
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However, Hariri was burdened with accusations from opposing parties. One 
of these accusations was financing Lebanese militias, like the Lebanese Forces, the 
Progressive Socialist Party, and Amal Movement, during the Lebanese war.  His 
payments to Christian warlord Elie Hobeika approximately reached up to 400,000 US 
Dollars a month to support his stand from the tripartiteagreement.  (Dib 2007, 524)  
However, the most important thing that Hariri had when he got to the power was 
international support due to the relationships that he had woven in the mid-1980’s 
with Washington and Paris through its then prime minister Jacques Chirac, as well as 
through the natural acceptance of the Syrian authority, after having agreed on his 
conditions (Bkassini 2009, 36).  The conditions were those announced by Hariri 
himself through his governance program,  ranging between the preservation of 
democracy and freedom, the sovereignty of law, the judiciary independence, the 
renewal of trust in the Lebanese economy, through decreasing the cost of production, 
enhancing the social services and making them more effective (Hariri 1999, 61).  
These were the announced conditions, but the unannounced ones were far 
from being economic.  Hariri came to power with a complete economic project while 
betting on peace with Israel.  Through this project, he was trying to re-establish the 
past economic role of Lebanon through advertising the country as a main centre for 
services. To accomplish this goal, his main concern was rebuilding Downtown Beirut 
(Dib 2007, p.530).  To reinforce his plan, Hariri bet on an economic integration 
between Lebanon and Syria, whereby he was convinced of the Syrian economic 
reform and its transformation to a free market economy (Bkassini 2009, 38-39).  
Hariri went on with his project mobilizing a big number of engineers, 
bankers and experts in order to execute it. He set a time limit to the project and named 
it ‘Horizon 2000’, provided it would be completed by the year 2002, at an estimated 
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cost of around 14 billion dollars. The expectations also indicated an increase of the 
income per capita that doubled on average, and a growth in national income of about 
9%.  
To achieve that, Hariri went on to obtain loans at times from the World 
Bank and at other times from local banks with record-high interest rates. Hariri 
resumed his project, overcoming the six-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 
1993 and his failure to send the army to the South.  He also surmounted Hizbollah’s 
accusations through the Party’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Kassem for being 
behind the massacre at the airport bridge in July of 1993, when the army shot innocent 
demonstrators protesting against the Oslo agreement (Hatoum 2010).  He also 
overcame the Sayidat Al-Najat church explosion and the ensuing decision that came 
out from the cabinet to disband the Lebanese Forces Party. Later, its leader Samir 
Geagea would be arrested and sentenced to life.  
All these incidents did not push Hariri to consider submitting his 
resignation. However, he didn’t hesitate in 1994 to threaten to overthrow the 
government after he noticed an opposition to his economic project in the parliament 
and inside the council of ministers itself. Perhaps, the most prominent event was the 
one related to Minister George Afram’s project to rebuild the electricity sector 
through a plan that did not please Hariri. Therefore, Rafik decided to dismiss George 
through a ministerial decree. This aroused a strong opposition from then pro-Syrian 
Minister Suleiman Franjieh. (Hatoum 20104) 
Hariri backed down on his resignation through a direct Syrian intervention 
that required the personal presence of Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam 
                                                 
4 From “Al-Waw Al-Kafira”, Firas Hatoum, Al Jadeed TV (2009), Interview with Slieman Franjieh 
former minister and a Christian leader. 
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in Beirut.  Hariri later founded what was known as the "Troika", which equally 
distributed power between the top three leaders.  In any case, his main concern was 
the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut by commissioning ‘Solidere’ company to 
accomplish this mission.  Hariri owned, as disclosed, 10% of company shares, this 
being the highest percentage that any investor could obtain. (Iskandar 2007).  Many 
queries were raised regarding the morality of the ‘Solidere’ project, especially after 
the objections of previous property owners in the downtown are on the way these 
properties were bought from them and the amount of money that they received in 
return.  In addition, there were doubts about the unrivalled facilities that the 
government offered to Solidere. These facilities went as far as selling government-
owned lands at cheap prices. (Wakim 1998, 143-156   ) 
Nonetheless, the opposition that Hariri faced did not influence his plans. At 
the time, he was the stronger man in the political equation. Perhaps, his ability to 
persuade the Syrian president to extend Former President Al-Hrawi’s mandate in 
1995 instead of electing then Army Commander Emile Lahoud as president, was the 
biggest testament to his power (Bkassini 2009, p.66).  However, the bad news at that 
time was regional events that somehow crept into his agenda, most prominent of 
which was the assassination of Israel’s Isaac Rabin in November, 1995, as it 
represented a painful blow to the peace process, since Hariri was betting on it to 
guarantee the success of his economic project.  
The 1996 war between Hezbollah and Israel enabled Hariri to succeed in 
presenting himself as the de facto Foreign Affairs Minister of Syria. This was due to 
the shuttle tours he made between world leaders, especially in Paris and Washington 
after the famous April agreement, which stated the rules that restrain both sides from 
targeting civilians. These rules laid the foundation of new clashes between Lebanon 
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and Israel, as it allowed the resistance to target Israeli soldiers in the occupied 
Lebanese territories (Bkassini 2009, 44-52).  
Nevertheless, Rafik Hariri’s role in April agreement was not necessarily 
positively marketed. For instance, his political advisor, Nuhad Al Mashnouq did not 
hesitate to announce that the real man who directly supervised most of the 
negotiations taking place was Late Syrian President Hafez Al Assad himself (Hatoum 
2010), in order to refute Journalist Ibrahim Al Amin’s accusations against Hariri, of 
trying to meddle with the text of the resolution in a way that goes against the interest 
of Lebanon’s resistance movements.  Al Amin, who is close to Hizbollah, said that 
Hariri insisted on using the term "launch" instead of "start" in the statement "it is 
forbidden to start resistance movements from populated areas."  (Hatoum 2010)  
Hariri succeeded in entering the parliament armed with a heavy 
parliamentary bloc in 1996.  A year later, the peace negotiations between the Israelis 
and the Syrians under American patronage died.  Nevertheless, Hariri still preserved 
his power. Meanwhile, the group close to Bashar Al-Asad, son of the Syrian president 
Hafez Al-Asad, had started laying its hands on the Lebanese file. Hereby, he managed 
to close down "New TV" channel when its editorial line conflicted with his economic 
plan, however, under the pretext that it did not fulfil the conditions specified by law 
no. 382 of the audio visual sector that was issued in 1994.  However, "New TV" was 
the channel most committed to the law that states that channels should not have any 
sectarian orientation. (382/94 law)  
The worst is that the channels that were allowed to broadcast were 
representative of the Lebanese sectarian makeup, since every confession and political 
grouphad one TV channel or more.  The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation was 
considered the channel of the Maronites, MTV represented the Orthodox, Future TV 
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was owned by Hariri and thus was considered for the Sunnis, Al Manar belonged to 
the Shiites, mainly Hezbollah, and NBN, also representing the Shiites, obtained a 
license before starting to broadcast simply because it was indirectly owned by 
parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.  
With the Syrian direct control over Lebanon and President Al-Hrawi’s 
mandate coming to an end, the latter tried to leave a good impression in the minds of 
the Lebanese people, by proposing different laws to the parliament.  Such laws 
included the option of a civil marriage, which was approved by the majority of the 
cabinet. However, Hariri refused to sign the decree under the pretext that it Hrawi 
suggested it from outside the ministerial program and without his consent.  As per the 
Constitution, this requires an agreement between the president and the prime minister. 
(Hrawi2002, 651)   But the real reason that made Hariri refuse to sign is because he 
was not willing to confront the religious authorities that refused optional civil 
marriage. In the same year, 1998, Hariri proved this by supporting the request of 
clerks to reinstate religion in the educational curriculum.  
 
3.5 Hariri in the Opposition 
Hrawi left the palace to be succeeded by Army Commander Emile Lahoud. 
Hariri was always against Lahoud’s holding presidency (Bkassini 2009, 66).  Lahoud 
was presented as a strong Christian amid a general atmosphere that was called "The 
Christian Depression," after General Michel Aoun was exiled and the leader of the 
Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea was sent to prison. The presidency also came in the 
midst of a campaign against Hariri that started in 1994, accusing him of trying to turn 
Lebanon into a Muslim country through buying large strips of lands in the Christian 
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areas, in addition to advocating naturalizing the Palestinians for his economic 
program to succeed (Bkassini 2009, 54).  
The worst thing that happened to Hariri was that the election of Lahoud was 
considered a victory to the team that was close to Bashar Al-Asad over that of Hariri’s 
friend, Abdel Halim Khaddam.  Most importantly, Lahoud came with an economic 
program and a vision that was completely different than Hariri’s program. (Hatoum 
20105). As such, Hariri chose to follow the advice of his friend, the French president 
at the time, Jacques Chirac, and manifest an impossible harmony with Lahoud.  He 
apologized for declining to form a government under the pretext that the president 
violated article 53 of the constitution that necessitates parliamentary consultations, 
after the majority of deputies empowered the president to appoint the person whom he 
finds appropriate. Hariri considered this as a negative sign coming from the Syrians 
(Bkassini 2009, 67-68).    
Hariri left the Lebanese economy with a general debt exceeding 18 billion 
dollars and a budget deficit that reached up to 59%, as opposed to having an economic 
overflow of over one-billion dollars, one of the highest national growth rates in the 
Middle East reaching 6%, before he enforced his economic project in 1993. (Iskandar 
2007, 76-97). He jumped off the "sinking boat" amidst economic indicators regarding 
the loss of financial resources and joined the opposition to combat a five-year 
economic plan that was led by Prime Minister Salim Al Hoss under the motto "People 
are more important than construction".  This plan aimed to reduce the deficit and to 
increase the average of growth through a policy of austerity that was centered on 
                                                 
5 From “Al-Waw Al-Kafira”, Firas Hatoum, Al Jadeed TV (2009), Interview with Hatoum  Interviwe 
with President Emil Lahoud 
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increasing tax income, imposing a tax on real estate profits and another tax on 
interests resulting from bank deposits (Al Hoss 2001, 17-19). 
Hariri succeeded in his opposition by disabling many of the issues that were 
suggested in this plan. On the other hand, he was faced with judiciary campaigns 
about financial corruption that targeted one of his main assistants, the Minister of 
Finance Fouad Al Sanioura.  This campaign was described as ‘malicious’, through 
which Lahoud tried to present Hariri as the mastermind of corruption (Iskandar 2007, 
103-104). However, the personalities that were persecuted by these judiciary 
campaigns were not limited to Hariri’s team, even if they formed the majority. The 
complaints by Lahoud also targeted Berri and Franjieh, who were allies of Syria.  
In May 2000, Israel retreated from Lebanon, which was considered as a big 
success to Hezbollah. This was succeeded immediately by the death of the Syrian 
president Hafez Al-Asad.  After him, his son Bashar inherited the power under an 
international approval. As for Hariri, he was preparing for the elections that witnessed 
the segregation of laws and electoral districts by the head of the Syrian intelligence in 
Lebanon Ghazi Kanaan, who was trying to weaken Hariri, as per the analysis of Hariri 
himself. Yet, it is hard to understand how "the law of Ghazi Kanaan" was directed 
against Hariri as long as the supporters of Hariri said that "the Syrian intelligence 
forced names in the list of Hariri, one of whom is Nasser Kandeel in Beirut" (Iskandar 
2007, 110). It is certain that Tele Liban started a violent campaign against Hariri, 
which was considered a usage of public media from the authorities. Nevertheless, the 
results came contradictory as Hariri won with the alliance of Walid Jumblat by 
sweeping all 19 seats of Beirut although it was divided into 3 districts, while Salim 
Al-Hoss failed tobe elected to the parliament, being replaced by pro-Hariri academic 
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Ghenwa Jalloul.  In brief, Hariri came back to power as the only and strongest Sunni 
leader. 
 
3.6 Hariri’s Second Mandate (2000-2004) 
Prime Minister Hariri was forming the second government during the 
mandate of Lahoud, bringing with him his own vision of public debt reduction 
through a plan that reduces public money squandering by privatizing the public 
sector. He came back convinced with the enthusiasm of the young Syrian president 
and his motivation for reform (Bkassini 2009, 76). However, the mandate of Hariri 
soon faced local and international obstacles. Internally, Druze leader Walid Jumblat 
was making his first political deviation asking for redeploying the Syrian forces in the 
Bekaa after the withdrawal of the Israelis from the Lebanese territories. 
The position of Jumblat came similar to the call of the bishops, and it was 
followed by reconciliation with the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir who made a 
historical visit to Mount Lebanon. This resulted in the events of May 7th, when 
members of the army intelligence assaulted innocent demonstrators who were 
showing their solidarity towards their friends whom were arrested by the security 
forces with some of the charges accusing them of being Israeli agents. These arrests 
were considered as the Syrian response to the reconciliation (Hatoum 2010) 
.Afterwards; the events of September 11 2001 came and mixed the regional cards 
amid internal information that indicates the exclusion of the team that is close to 
Abdel Halim Khaddam from the Lebanese file. This was demonstrated through the 
appointment of Colonel Rustom Ghazali in place of Ghazi Kanaan to whom Hariri 
had delivered the key to Beirut while saying farewell.  
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Hariri dealt with the new circumstances and continued with his plan that 
aimed at privatizing the public sector based on what was stipulated in both Paris I and 
II conferences in years 2001 and 2002. One of the economic conditions was also the 
elimination of the exclusive agencies and what they represent as monopoly in the 
market. This issue was actually realized by the government, which issued on the 14th 
of February 2002 the law that vowed to ban exclusive agencies.  This decision 
mobilized the anger of Christians in the face of Hariri, since this was considered as 
the last deathblow against the remainder of the "political Maronitism" through 
tampering with the economic privileges of the Christians in general and the Maronites 
in specific. This was accompanied by advertising campaigns against him throughout 
the Christian channels through advertisements that still stick to people’s minds to-
date. One such advertisement is the incapability of Einstein of solving the puzzle of 
reducing the Lebanese public debt. (Al-Shark Al Awsat newspaper6) 
Accordingly, Hariri acquiesced to the Christian campaign and suspended 
the exclusive agencies law, while he continued organizing his relationship with the 
Syrian security regime based on the old rule: "economy is my responsibility while 
security is yours". For this reason, Hariri did not object to closing down the Christian 
MTV channel which had a biased position during the Metn sub-elections in which the 
Christian opposition was defeated against the Christian Syrian allies. This has 
witnessed the actual birth of "Kornet Shehwan" group, which was considered as the 
political party of the Maronite patriarch. Meanwhile, Walid Jumblat was repositioning 
himself depending on what suited his supportive discourse for the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon.  
                                                 
6 Mashroua’ elghaa’ al himaya aan al wikalat al hasrria youfajir harban tilfizionia fi loubnan, (2002, 
February 22)  Al-Shark Al Awsat newspaper, Retrieved from  
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=1&article=90299&issueno=8491 
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 Hariri was offended by the "Syrian-Lebanese Intelligence Regime", as the 
parliament withdrew its approval of the criminal trial law instantly, however, re-
approved one day later under Head of the General Security Apparatus, General Jamil 
Sayyed’s request.  Sayyed was considered as the most powerful man and the closest 
to Damascus (Bkassini (2009), p. 114). However, it is important to note that this law 
would not have passed without an American-Syrian deal.  The deal was confirmed 
when the parliament approved on the same day the law of intellectual protection and 
copywrites. 
With the invasion of Iraq in the year 2003, the facts indicated that the 
international and the regional circumstances that once sponsored Ta’ef agreement, 
were now crumbling.  This coincided with "Bank Al Madina" scandal and all its 
implications that almost seriously affected the Lebanese banking sector due to the 
correlation of the money laundering scandal with official Lebanese and Syrian 
personalities.   
As for Hariri, he was secretly dissatisfied with the "security coup" against 
the economical recommendations of "Paris II" implemented in his opposition of 
Lahoud’s stance against the privatization project, and being "forced" by the Syrian 
Intelligence to resign in order to reappoint a cabinet based on new equations.  Hariri 
had only three ministers in the new cabinet, who were all Sunnis and not members of 
the parliament. 
 
3.7 The Assassination 
Due to these economic and political issues, locally and regionally, the 
Syrian regime decided to extend Lahoud’s presidency mandate.  Hariri initially 
opposed the extension but changed his mind and supported the decision after meeting 
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with Bashar Al-Asad.  However, he refrained from forming the government of the 
new extended mandate.  Meanwhile, Walid Jumblat witnessed a second turning point, 
hence, opposing the presidential extensionand asking for the repositioning of Syrian 
Forces according to Ta’ef Agreement.  
The extension of Lahoud’s mandate coincided with issuing UN Security 
Council Resolution 1559, which stipulated that Syria withdraws its forces from 
Lebanon, and the disarmament of militias. This decision intensified the media and 
security campaigns against Hariri, who was implicitly accused by Syrian allies to 
stand behind the decision of the Security Council, especially that his relations with the 
Christian groups in Kornet Shehwan was starting to consolidate publicly.  In 
accordance, the issues accelerated dramatically and led to the assassination of Hariri 
on 14 of February 2005.  
Hariri, the ‘Godfather’ of Ta’ef agreement, was assassinated and the streets 
and squares were filled with unprecedented crowds, dividing the political scene into 
the coalitions of pro-Syrian 8th March and anti-Syrian 14th March.  These coalitions 
continue to fight over managing the country’s affairs after the withdrawal of the 
Syrian Forces from Lebanon, especially that Syria was politically accused of being 
responsible for the assassination of Hariri.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHIHA’S THOUGHTS ANALYSIS 
 
To analyze Chiha’s thoughts it’s necessary to consider the foundations and 
ideological tools that he adopted to present his political and economic vision. 
Accordingly, his claim to enhance the role of geography in school curriculum and his 
encouragement to teach it with passion came out of his conviction that geography 
plays a central role in determining the identity and role of any country in the world. 
   
4.1 Conceptual frame  
"Geographic determination", as Traboulsi labels it, is the basis of Chiha’s 
intellectual system defined in a comprehensive geographic view of the world as well 
as life.  This theory was mainly adopted by the Belgian Orientalist father Henri 
Lammens and the British historian Arnold Toynbee who believed that the terrains 
control the destinies of human beings. Jawad Boulos agreed, defining Lebanon as a 
geographic nation (Traboulsi 1999, 37). Projecting this geographic point of view on 
Lebanon renders it the product of its natural terrains, the sea, the mountains, the 
snows and the forests. Based on this, the constitutive definition of Lebanon is 
expressed through its mountain and sea, Chiha explains that "a group of physiological 
and social necessities mould the face of a certain country" (Chiha 1957, 47). 
         "Geography creates history and controls the destinies and strategies of nations. 
We can call it the nature of things". This is one of the famous conclusions that Chiha 
wrote in one of his editorials in Lejour newspaper. The most prominent aspect of this 
conclusion is designating geography as "the nature of things". What he meant is that 
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the economic, political and national identity of Lebanon throughout history is as 
stable and deep-seated as its unchanging geography. This way, Lebanon becomes the 
prisoner of a dual geographic definition. First of all, Lebanon is a country that stands 
at the crossroad of the ancient world continents -Europe, Asia and Africa-; secondly 
Lebanon unites the sea and the mountain (Chiha 1962, 162). This definition – 
regardless of its accuracy– formed the cornerstone of Michel Chiha’s intellectual 
system. 
4.2 Lebanese Identity  
Chiha introduces Lebanon’s "geographic definition" as a country "that only 
resembles itself … a country which is unique, one of its kind". He stresses that this is 
what we have to know "now and forever" (Chiha 1957, 178). As such, modern 
Lebanon is the fusion of mountain and sea. It is the country of immigration and refuge 
at the same time. The mountain is the impervious fort to the minorities in escaping the 
majorities’ dominance. It is also the barrier that prevents the extension of the East.  
The sea represents the openness to the West. It is the historical extension of 
Phoenicia and portrays the adventurous sailor that leaves his land to tour the world. 
The union between the mountain and the sea is permanent, whereby the mountain 
forms "the fort that elevates from the sea and protects it" (Chiha 1962, 162-163). This 
makes Lebanon a maritime nation and the Lebanese people are "traders" and "inter-
sharing sectarian minorities". As long as the "sea and the mountain remain exactly 
where they are" Lebanon’s structure will remain the same (Chiha 1957, 124).   
"People of Traders" who are "inter-sharing sectarian minorities"; this 
definition of Chiha differed from some of his peers in the Young Phoenicians club 
and the Lebanese Nationalists. Upon asking him whether the Lebanese are a people or 
a nation, Chiha answered they are simply Lebanese (Traboulsi 1999, 48), introducing 
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the Lebanese as a "Mediterranean variant" (Chiha, 1962, 24-25). The difference of 
opinion between Chiha and the Lebanese intellectuals who perceive Lebanon as a 
Christian nation goes back to the importance that Chiha places on the sea in contrast 
to the significance of the Christian and Maronite mountain that Edward Honein used 
to believe in: "Lebanon is the mountain and his people are the Maronites" (Traboulsi 
1999, 48). The symbolism of the sea is what makes Lebanon an extension of 
Phoenicia. A history is traced back to before the formation of Mount Lebanon, which 
is considered a fort for the minorities in general and specifically the Christians.  
Phoenicia is one of the four reasons Chiha refers to in ruling out the Arab 
nature of Lebanon. Other than the fact that the Phoenicians’ history goes back to 
centuries before the Arabs, Chiha also denies the roles of language and religion in the 
national formation. In addition, he refused to categorize the Lebanese people as 
Semites due to their intermingling throughout history with the Indo-European race 
(Chiha 1962, 24-25). Chiha even goes further in his denial of Lebanon’s Arab 
belonging; he denies the united identity of the Arabs themselves, thus distinguishing 
between the Arabs of the sea and the Arabs of the continent. The first "pushes the 
other in vain towards the farthest ends of the Earth" while the second "abides to the 
life of grazing and dairy products" (Chiha 1962, 162).  
It comes as no surprise that one of Chiha’s objections on the national pact 
between Beshara Al-Khoury and Riyadh Al-Solh was specifically the issue of the 
Arab facet of Lebanon. He went further by completely disregarding this 
categorization throughout his comment on the ministerial statement of the 
independence government. As such, he settles by defining "Lebanon as it is, with its 
present borders, the independent sovereign Lebanon", considering that it is simply 
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"nothing but the echo of our beliefs that we follow always and forever" (Chiha 1957, 
35-37).  
In conclusion, Chiha draws the Lebanese nationalism features relying on the 
permanence of geography. Accordingly, he specifies the cultural and economic 
identity of Lebanon. However, many remarks could be raised throughout Chiha’s 
analytical discourse. Even if we conceded to his "geographic viewpoint", how could 
we explain the contradiction in Chiha’s discourse when defining the Lebanese people 
as being traders based on the duality of the sea and the mountain?  The contradiction 
resides first in the omission of territorial Lebanon which is also a major geographic 
component with specific cultural and economic characteristics. Moreover, Chiha’s 
explanation that the land is the extension of the mountain is not at all convincing. 
Also, the most important point remains the obliteration of the economic identity of the 
mountain. Even if Chiha affirmed the cultural identity of the mountain as a fort for the 
minorities, he did not attribute to it any economic differentiation. Despite this, he was 
the one to insist on the differentiation between the Arab of Adib Shishakli and the 
Arab of Saudi King based on the difference of the geographic belonging and what it 
incurs as cultural and economic differences.   
The cultural and the social definition of Lebanon remains to Chiha the fort for 
minorities as "spiritual families" totally differing in their "ethical" and moral walks 
(Chiha 1957, 17). Yet, this definition does not offer a scientific justification to 
understand the minorities as a cultural and ethnic component. It is obvious that Chiha 
categorizes the Lebanese as minorities. But he does not explain the basis his 
definition. This is a question which is not answered in Chiha’s intellectual system. 
Even if we agreed that the minorities are defined according to the Muslim Sunni 
majority in the Arab region, then there would be two issues that would be hard to 
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explain. The first one is that the mountain, as a geographic terrain, existed before 
Islam. Therefore, it is impossible to specify minorities based on the Muslim Sunni 
majority. Secondly, the Sunnis themselves are a major component of the Lebanese 
people, therefore it is impossible to identify the minorities according to the "Muslim 
Sunni" criterion otherwise the Sunnis would not be considered part of the Lebanese 
community based on Chiha’s definition. However, Chiha clearly described the 
Muslim Sunni as a minority when he was congratulating himself on the independence, 
stating that the "minority" that was questioning the existence of Lebanon was 
compelled to recognize the country’s independence (Chiha 1957, 44). 
Chiha’s "minoritizing" of all the Lebanese confessions is not the only fault in 
his intellectual system. His definition of nationalism as being a collective form of self-
esteem, and his ascertainment that the willpower of co-existence is what unifies the 
Lebanese people can also be criticized. Traboulsi considers this definition as the 
"apex" of contradiction. He says Chiha is running in a vicious circle, on the one hand, 
he confirms the inevitable role of geography in forming the cultural and economic 
identity, and its strength on human beings cannot be substituted. On the other hand, he 
affirms the role of the human will in determining the features of the Lebanese 
nationalism. Hence, this represents the contradiction between absolute coercion and 
absolute free-will (Traboulsi 1999, 55).  
 
4.3 The Political vision  
Chiha puts the Lebanese "uniqueness" through its geographical location in a 
political context making the inter-sharing sectarian minorities as the purpose of 
Lebanon’s existence. Clearly Chiha now drops the sea from his geographic viewpoint 
and limits it only to the mountain.  
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4.3.1 Sectarianism  
Even if the young Chiha doubted the establishment of a nation based on 
confessions, and considered "the confessions victory" as the "nation’s loss" (Chiha 
1957, 20), the politician and veteran journalist in Chiha did not hesitate to justify 
sectarianism and its role. He stated that "in the current situation, it is a natural and 
legal issue". Hence, "why would we want to rudely change the product of generations 
… especially since sectarianism remains the reason behind forgiveness in Lebanon 
after many mistakes and trespasses"? (Chiha, 2004, 238).  
In 1953, a few months before his death, Chiha reached the height of defending 
sectarianism when he enthusiastically defended "the philosophy of sectarianism" in 
Lebanon during his commentary in a parliamentary session devoted to discuss the 
abolition of political sectarianism. He said: "we might separate the church from the 
government, but no one will be able to separate the government from God. What 
exceeds the groups and the personal status, there is in the government, the necessary 
presence of the immortal divine self" (Chiha 1957, 261). As such, Chiha makes of 
sectarianism a godly reality that cannot be surpassed. It is thus a natural and structural 
phenomenon that violence cannot deter. Only time might or might not be able to 
defeat it (Chiha 1957, 270). Through this point specifically, we can see the 
fingerprints of Chiha in the Lebanese constitution.  
Articles 9 and 10 of the constitution are considered the instilling prints of 
Chiha. We had already indicated that Michel Chiha, Petro Trad and Chebel Damous 
were assigned the responsibility to draft the Lebanese constitution using the French 
constitution as inspiration. However, the difference from the French version resides in 
articles 9 and 10. Article 9 says that "the freedom of belief is absolute and the 
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government, by performing its duties of honoring God, respects all religions and 
confessions and guarantees the freedom of performing religious rituals under its 
protection, provided that public order is not disturbed". It also guarantees that the 
"personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect 
they belong, is respected". This article places God on top of the political and moral 
system of the Lebanese people. The expression of the "freedom of belief is absolute" 
soon to be met with "respect of all the religions and confessions" are based on the 
government performing its duties of "honoring God".  
However, the Lebanese constitution seems to deny the atheists their right in 
expressing themselves, since the core of their beliefs contradicts with the "honoring 
duty towards God". Article 10 mentions that "education is free insofar as it is not 
contrary to public order and morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of 
the religions or creeds. There shall be no violation of the right of religious 
communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued 
by the state regulating public instruction". The rights of religions are preserved in the 
constitution through education, but nowhere in the article is education made 
mandatory or offered gratis.   
We cannot question the ability to build the concept of citizenship under a 
constitution that encourages freedom of religious education, but does not consider 
education as the social responsibility of the government. If the sects and the 
confessions are responsible in educating their generations then who would volunteer 
to perform the role of the government in implementing social welfare? A simple 
recollection of Chiha’s discourse proves that the purpose of this article was mainly to 
affirm through law that individuals do not exist in this nation unless through their 
sectarian affiliation in a "country of inter-sharing minorities".  
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To an extent Article 10 also limits freedom which contradicts article 9’s 
"absolute" freedom. Indeed, referring to the education as "free provided that it does 
not disturb public order … or molest the dignity of one of the religions" is believed to 
contain many restrictions that might damage the Lebanese academic curriculum, since 
most of modern sciences contradict religiously with scientific explanations. This 
means that Darwin and the Big Bang theories must be prohibited. Even if one argues 
that some religious explanations do not contradict with science, this does not justify 
why the educational system in Lebanon should be subject to various religious 
interpretations. Through articles 9 and 10 of the constitution, we can conclude that the 
freedom is guaranteed for different sects. However, it is not so for those who are 
outside the inter-sharing minorities. This way, freedom also becomes a sectarian 
privilege. No wonder, since "the traditions of Lebanon should protect it from the 
power of change"(Chiha 1962, 37).  
 
Real freedom is "the legitimate freedom that honors the human being and not 
the one that denigrates him" (Chiha 2004, 156). This is one of the many statements 
that confirm Chiha’s involvement in introducing the two constitutional articles. The 
"traditionalism" of Chiha in translating freedom was not limited to the educational 
curriculum, but also in his vision of the suitable political systems for Lebanon. He 
also sees it through the uniqueness of Lebanon as being an exceptional case. He 
refused importing and imposing any political system on Lebanon because of its inter-
sharing minority’s status quo. Based on this, the importance of the parliament does 
not reside according to Chiha in being the nest of democracy, or one of the faces of 
civilization and freedom, but rather describes it as a sectarian congregation that 
guarantees peace (Chiha 2004, 96).  
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4.3.2 Legislative Authority 
Chiha does not identify with the politicians who lie in their refusal for political 
sectarianism by affirming their democracy. The parliament in the end puts across a 
"creative face of the many faces of federalism". As such, it imitates the Swiss 
example relying on cantons – i.e. the sects in Lebanon’s case – with the difference of 
its base being geography for cantons and legislation for sects.  The parliament itself 
ought not to be only an expression of democracy, but a meeting place for common 
sectarian groups, for the sake of expressing the will of co-existence (Chiha 2004, 
110). It is an attempt for a "peaceful cohabitation between different religious 
communities, traditions and races" (Chiha 2004, 197), because diverse elements can 
only be unified and drawn closer "through enacting the laws together amidst a 
legislative council" (Chiha 2004, 21).  
Based on what was presented, Chiha fears that the sectarian authority would 
take over in case the parliament was absent (Chiha 2004, 51). As such, sectarianism is 
the structure of the Lebanese primitive society. However, the room for discussion 
between the sects in a sophisticated, fair, peaceful and advanced manner is not 
possible unless under the auspices of the parliament. And since it controls everything, 
respecting the rule of the proportional sectarian representation in the parliament is the 
right thing (Chiha 2004, 69). Chiha links a sectarian importance to the parliament, this 
led him several times to announce his desire in increasing the number of deputies in 
the council, since this increase would also imply considerable chances for an increase 
of the opposition inside the council rather than on the streets (Chiha 2004, 137). 
However, in return, Chiha did not hide his opposition on establishing a senate council 
similar to the French or Swiss structure, i.e. a council that would serve as an advisor 
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for the parliament. Chiha considered that the parliament, by containing all 
confessions, is able to ensure the decision-making and legislation processes; hence 
there is no need for an advisory council which would only have a role of passing 
theories. Based on these assumptions, he insists that the parliament must first play its 
role in a serious manner, before thinking of creating a second council (Chiha 2004, 
129).   
It is worth noting here that the opposition of Chiha to the senate council 
reflects his power in the constitutional and political life. The constitution, that Chiha 
himself participated in drafting, mentioned the establishment of such a council in 
article 22. However, within a year from the declaration of the constitution this article 
was annulled. This reveals how Chiha was able to influence the annulment of what he 
opposed while he was a member of the committee. Chiha also opposed calls to build a 
second representative council responsible for the representation of the economic and 
social interests (Traboulsi 1999, 208).   
This comes as no surprise as Chiha had never envisaged roles to the 
parliament that surpassed legislation in the narrowest of its limits such as organizing 
the relationships between the different confessions. He was against the interference of 
the parliament in the economic affairs, since he was keen on protecting the economic 
interests from the implications of the sectarian differences. Based on this, one can find 
him separating between the management and the parliament in terms of sectarian 
representation, exempting the first from the authorities of the latter. Chiha also 
stresses the importance of subjecting managerial positions to a scale of competency 
and efficiency, and not to the sectarian quotas logic (Chiha 1957, 81).    
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4.3.3 Executive Authority 
The differentiation between parliament and management springs from Chiha’s 
perception that the constitution makes the Lebanese republic a "royal republic". 
Traboulsi cites a study about the jurist Antoine Azar concluding that the Lebanese 
constitution is inspired from the Belgian constitution of year 1831 and the Egyptian 
constitution of year 1923, more than being inspired from the France’s Third Republic 
constitution. As such, the president of the republic appears in the constitutional text as 
a republican king (Traboulsi 1999, 205). Disregarding the origins from which the 
Lebanese constitution was taken, it remains certain that the authority of the French 
high commissioner was present in the 1926 constitution. He was given the right to 
suspend the constitution, disband the parliament and had within his control almost all 
the executive authorities. These authorities were handed down to the president of the 
republic upon the amendment of the constitution in 1943, which has formed the spark 
of Lebanon’s independence.   
Although Chiha took a neutral position from the independence’s amendments 
since he was against the complete independence from France, Chiha held on to the 
constitution to criticize the national pact. This was related to the issue of limiting the 
executive authority to the president and dealing with the prime minister as simple 
functionary and nothing more. Of course, Chiha had additional remarks on the 
national pact, especially in relation to the Arab facet of Lebanon, as addressed earlier, 
and the foreign policy of Lebanon, which we would tackle later. 
 The executive authority represented a central point in Chiha’s discourse, 
especially in the contradiction between the content of the national pact and the 
constitutional provisions. The national pact (the ministerial statement of the 
independence government) hinted to a partnership in decision-making between the 
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president and the prime minister, when stating that ruling Lebanon is a partnership 
between the Muslims and Christians (Traboulsi 2007, p.188). This totally contradicts 
the constitution that limits the executive authority to the president with no other 
partner. Even cabinet meetings cannot be held without his presence. He is the number 
one legislator who has the right to send laws to the parliament or even abolish the 
parliament itself.  This indicates that Chiha’s loyalty to the constitution was principle-
driven. Thus, he opposed the amendments of the constitution that allowed the 
extension of his brother-in-law president Beshara El Khoury’s mandate. He wrote an 
article criticizing the amendment since he considered it an issue of principle, and is 
not related to the president as a person. "The law is strict; however it is still the law, 
as per the Romans" (Chiha 2004, 123).  
The president of the republic had a quasi absolute power and this exempted 
the executive authority from any questioning and accountability. Chiha defended this 
power, what lad Traboulsi to the conclusion that although Chiha mentioned that 
Lebanon is a country that is "disobedient to reform"; he himself did not envisage 
reform in the first place.  On the one hand, he refused to establish an economic and 
social council; while on the other hand, he refused to discuss the principle of 
separating the cabinet from the parliament (Traboulsi 1999, 208). Above all, through 
his attempts to make traditions triumph over power, Chiha did not hesitate to describe 
the reform as being "the practice of power, or a form of violence, or at its best a strike 
of insanity and foolishness", thus calling for replacing reform with the adoption of the 
priorities in the moral values" (Traboulsi 1999, 221). Traboulsi perceives that this 
intellectual system made sure above anything else to protect the economic interests of 
the bourgeoisie.   
4.4 Economic Vision 
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Chiha’s definition of the Lebanese economy does not stray away from his 
golden rule in determining any role through the "geographical determinism". He 
draws the outline of the Lebanese economy based on three arguments that exclusively 
relate to the geographic location of Lebanon: Firstly, Lebanon is a maritime nation, 
secondly, Lebanon lacks raw materials, and thirdly the Lebanese people are traders 
since "they are importers before anything else" (Chiha 1965, 309). These three 
arguments are called the "three commandments of Chiha", since to-date they form the 
main elements in introducing the Lebanese economy. They are interrelated and 
complementary. In his definition of Lebanon as a maritime nation, Chiha drops the 
mountain from his double geographic equation -the mountain and the sea- and settles 
for the sea and its geographic indication of Lebanon’s trade roots since Phoenicia. 
Based on this, the Lebanese people become like their ancestors, the Phoenician 
sailors, but only importers because of their inability to export since the Lebanese 
mountains is devoid of raw materials.  The land, in any case is not part of the 
geographic equation of Chiha’s intellectual system as explained earlier. Accordingly, 
Chiha presents his economic-geographic characterization as "the nature of things" 
specifying the role of economy in the frame of trade and services as an answer to the 
inevitable necessity. He then transforms this role to a willed choice describing it as an 
intellectual activity that forms a "form of civilization" (Traboulsi 1999, 65).  
Based on the above characterization, Chiha undertakes finding solutions to the 
Lebanese economy as a unique case just as everything else in Lebanon is portrayed in 
his intellectual system. Here again Chiha makes use of the Swiss example, however 
this time from the economic point of view as being "a fiscal paradise and a center for 
sumptuous tourism and gambling games (Chiha 1965, 271). Just as Switzerland is the 
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link between European countries due to its geographic location, Lebanon is the link 
between the international market and the Arab world (Chiha 1965, 265).  
4.4.1 Trade and Commerce  
Here Chiha shapes his concept of the Lebanese as being traders, referring to 
the external trade and not the internal one. It is a trade that Chiha was not fond of 
during his youth. He always expressed his doubts on its capability of building a nation 
based on a trading culture. He then wrote "we buy to sell, so what are we creating? 
Art and science escape us. Here is our weakness. We lack a role model: here resides 
our inability and insanity". While defining the Lebanese people as traders, he even 
adds a remark that "the bones of our fathers were warmer than our very lives" (Chiha 
2004, 27). However, Chiha’s criticism on trade soon turned into praise considering it 
as "one of our biggest strengths" (Chiha 2004, 155). "Trade is the only means of our 
survival; since Lebanon’s economic life goes through maritime, airline and land 
routes" (Chiha 2004, 211).  
Consequently, Chiha emphasizes the importance of activating the role of 
commerce; He suggests having a "lord-mayor" or a syndicate in order to have an 
official representation for this profession that contributes in stipulating rules and 
systems and enabling the profession to have a higher rank than it currently does. He 
also calls the traders to be active in the government as well as its councils. Therefore, 
when the trader serves himself, he would also be serving his country (Chiha 2004, 
156).  
4.4.2 Industry 
Chiha noticed Lebanon’s lack of raw materials, yet he concluded that the 
Lebanese people are the precious human resources, since they have the ability to 
create new professions "that maintain opulent customers in Lebanon" (Chiha 2004, 
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42). Therefore Chiha considers the "cleverness" of the Lebanese people’s which he 
names ‘acrobatics’ as the raw materials of Lebanon.  Chiha constantly called to 
protect human resources, an issue that could not be achieved without protecting the 
industry, yet Chiha did not show any enthusiasm towards it. He believed that "huge 
production neither relates to the Lebanese nature, nor their mood, nor their genius … 
but to see the Lebanese relegated to a factory to operate stupidly, is the job of a robot 
and not what the Lebanese should since there will not be any bright future in that". 
Therefore, any encouragement for the trade came with many conditions from Chiha’s 
side. The first condition was not to tamper with customs, while the second condition 
was to make factories rely on themselves (Chiha 1965, 155). He even goes further and 
calls for imposing the pre-surveillance on industrial projects, and perhaps offering a 
license in advance (Chiha 1965, 253), to prevent the adoption of any new industries 
that do not have the constituents of survival, or industries that might harm the 
freedom of others. Traboulsi deduces that this leaves the industry only for importers 
(Traboulsi 1999, 70).  
 
4.4.3 Agriculture 
The difference between the young Chiha and Chiha the veteran politician and 
banker is evident in his attitude towards the agricultural sector. In 1929, Chiha used to 
believe that the Lebanese economy relies on the import of produced goods and the 
export of agricultural products. At that time, Chiha held on to Greater Lebanon and 
defended against those calling for the partition of some regions to preserve its 
Christian demographic supremacy.  He believed that the Bekaa valley was able to be 
agriculturally self-sufficient at the lowest limit. However, this conviction soon 
evaporated with the dominance of the services sector and its capitalist nature. As 
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such, Lebanon at the dawn of independence was still importing one third of its needs 
in grains, i.e. exactly the same amount that small Lebanon needed before annexing the 
Bekaa and Akkar (Traboulsi 1999, 71). Accordingly, Lebanon turned into a country 
that imports agricultural products and exports services. This is where Chiha dropped 
the mountain from his geographic viewpoint, and with it he removed the peasants 
living in the mountain from his economic considerations.   
  
4.4.4 Services 
Chiha started searching for a liberalist economy with financial capitalism as 
pillar, since he considered the industrial capitalism an unsuitable equation for 
Lebanon’s uniqueness. Therefore, he called for investing in the fields of service, 
tourism and real estate, contradicting others who were calling for the investment in 
the productive sectors. Though, Chiha known as the engineer of the Lebanese 
economy had by this laid theories for an economic structure that enabled the exports 
to exceed the imports.  
Accordingly Lebanon was based on a unique economic structure that even the 
economic expert Van Zilan gave up on understanding the Lebanese economic 
situation after his study, saying: I totally do not understand what you are doing, but 
whatever it is, just continue doing it". (Traboulsi, 1999, 42). If we put aside the advice 
of Van Zilan in nourishing the production sectors, the Lebanese miracle that the 
Belgian economist failed to understand, was simply a number of "acrobatics" based 
on Chiha’s perceptions.  
The first acrobatic move and the most important one was what Chiha called 
"the hidden incomes". They are meant essentially to adjust the balance of payments. 
Where does this income originates from? Chiha works on shedding the light over 
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immigration, a social problem, and turn it into a phenomenon of economic benefit. As 
such, the hidden income is the one sent by the Lebanese worker who leaves his post 
as a paid employee… and immigrates searching for a job (Chiha 1965, 229). 
However, the Lebanese immigrants are not the only source for it. There is also the 
"stranger that comes to spend his capital in our country… and the one who is 
determined to build his house in our country". Yet, there are differences between 
strangers as per the intellectual system of Chiha. The stranger, who is welcomed in 
Lebanon, is the one who comes with his capital (Chiha 1965, 233). He is the foreigner 
that the Lebanese people could not hate, since that would be considered a strike of 
suicide (Chiha 1962, 159). As for the poor foreigner such as the Palestinian, Chiha 
does not hesitate to call for their relocation throughout all the Arab countries 
(Traboulsi 1999, 81). This is a clear equation that welcomes the rich foreigner and 
keeps away the poor one, since the first one increases revenues and the latter increases 
expenses, while the main rule is to reduce the expenses to their minimum, and to 
increase the revenues without taking any production risks.  
 Chiha recognized that the hidden income strongly relates to foreign factors, and 
therefore they are unstable and cause the economy to be subordinated to these factors. 
Despite this, the brilliant banker did not show much concern towards this issue. He 
even continued to accept the reality that the Lebanese economy is a consumer 
economy. He also defended the centralization of production in a few Western 
countries at the expense of the developing ones. He considered centralization to be the 
trait of the era, in addition to being a natural and "quasi inevitable" result (Chiha 
1962, 120).   
 Nevertheless, Chiha had a recipe against the collapse of the Lebanese economy due 
to the foreign changes that it relies upon. This recipe resides in the continuous 
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encouragement for the gold coverage of the Lebanese currency. He even went as far 
as advising the government to buy gold from the local market even if its value 
exceeded the foreign markets (Chiha 1965, 226). Although Chiha believed this to be 
an essential condition for the political and social stability he refused to turn the 
monetary stability into an obsession, "and dispense working in the others facets of 
life" (Chiha 2004, 146). Here Traboulsi draws the attention to another contradiction of 
Chiha, calling the government to interfere in supporting the monetary stability means 
he is asking it to intervene in the economy (Traboulsi 1999, 85). Such an intervention 
contradicts Chiha’s firm conviction in undermining the role of the government in all 
economic sectors.  
 
4.4.5 Government’s Role  
The role of the government in the economy is clear according to Chiha: "let it 
go ahead with courage towards the highest limits of liberalism" (Chiha 1962, 138). 
This means, clearly that the government should not be concerned with supporting the 
production industries. It also limits the intervention of the latter in the state budget, 
the financial and tax legislations. Chiha’s animosity towards the production sectors 
has been addressed.  Similarly Chiha reduces the state budget to an extent that it is not 
even equivalent to a company’s budget size.  He calls for small budgets reducing the 
expenditure to its lowest limit as well as the incomes since the increase of expenditure 
will certainly incur an increase of incomes, which in turn would drag with it a chain 
of taxes, fees or government debt. All of these matters are forbidden in Chiha’s 
system. He was one of the supporters of the legislative stability, and opposed all 
forms of taxes, including the ones imposed on income, revenues and properties. The 
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brilliant banker was not in favor of debt since this would lead to shaking the trust in 
the currency and the economy (Chiha 1965, 262).  
Moreover, Chiha always called for the removal of customs imposed on the 
imports. Even his request and advocacy to separate the customs from Syria were 
closely related to his strong desire to remove the custom fees since they are 
considered obstacles to the Lebanese economy. This was in addition to other reasons 
as Najib Al Rayes called "the importers party" (Traboulsi 1999, 123). A reason 
behind the custom separation is the issue of the exclusive trade agencies that Chiha 
defended constantly through defending the Lebanese agents who import from foreign 
companies, before that the Syrian traders complained that most of these agencies were 
in the hands of the Lebanese people. This came in the midst of the Lebanese-Syrian 
negotiations to settle the common economic interests. In this respect, it is up to us to 
read and understand what Chiha meant when he said: "when defending its economic 
independence, Lebanon is defending its independence and its existence in general. 
And here both the political and economic reasons reunite" (Chiha 1965, 162).  
With this conclusion that highlights the economy’s control over politics, it 
becomes feasible to analyze Chiha’s intellectual system, especially the economic 
aspect in comparison to the Marxist analysis. Therefore, Chiha’s discourse could be 
perceived as a class discourse representing the interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, 
who perceived the economic union with Syria as a threat to their economic and 
political existence. Chiha’s mixing between the economy and politics along with 
everything we presented, leads us to perceive Chiha as a bourgeoisie version of 
Marxism, a "Social class being", since he is the one that expressed animosity towards 
the social legislations. He denied the presence of workers in Lebanon, let alone the 
idea of unemployment, since he considered that Lebanon essentially relies on 
57 
agriculture and tourism (Chiha 1965, 241-244), asking to "leave the traders of all the 
trading branches alone. Let them perform their professions with proficiency and 
secure the government’s salary!" (Chiha, 2004, 224). 
 
4.5 Foreign policy  
In his vision of Lebanon’s foreign policy, Michel Chiha also resorted to his 
convictions of Lebanon as a "refuge for minorities", always destined to seek the 
protection of a greater force. This conviction adhered with Chiha throughout his life. 
It did not change despite all the regional and international changes that affected 
Lebanon, the region and the world. His "Lebanese nationalist" beliefs have been the 
same ever since he was an active young man. He agreed with Youssef Al-Sawda in 
his geographic vision of Lebanon. However, he disagreed with him regarding the 
ability of the country to achieve an absolute independence. As such, he did not 
hesitate to affirm the claim of Lebanon’s independence under French protection. 
Chiha even considered that Lebanon’s real independence is the day that Lebanon was 
announced as Greater Lebanon in 1920. Based on this conviction, he only seconded 
the 1936 agreement because it legalized the presence of the French forces in Lebanon 
for a period of two decades.  
He used the same logic upon Lebanon’s independence in 1943. He did not 
hide his doubts towards the role that the English General Spears performed during the 
rebellion of Lebanese leaders to the mandate’s authority, while undertaking essential 
constitutional amendments that took away some of the authorities of the high 
commissioner. However, Chiha did not express any animosity to this amendment, yet, 
he showed his understanding towards France’s position, which refused this 
amendment, and worked on suspending the constitution. Chiha’s remark was not 
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concerning the independence as an event, but it was pointed towards the ministerial 
statement of the first government of Sami Al-Solh. This government represented later 
the heart of the national pact between Al-Solh and Beshara Al-Khoury. Chiha 
expressed his strong opposition to the article that stated that Lebanon should not join 
the foreign alliances and that it should not be a base or a passage of colonization, 
which is one of the matters that Chiha continued to oppose, despite being the closest 
man and most powerful consultant of Khoury, and despite the announcement of the 
state of Israel in 1948, where Chiha himself announced that "Lebanon’s problem has 
now started".  
Chiha is considered one of the most advocate writers of Palestine. He did not 
hesitate to describe Zionism as the Racists School. He held the West responsible for 
announcing the state of Israel, considering the United States as the legal mother of 
this "monster in her guts". However, he did not change his position that considered it 
a necessity to ally with the West, as he believed that they are the only forces capable 
of finding solutions in this respect. Despite that, history witnesses Chiha’s support for 
the Arab struggle in facing Israel. He considered that the separation would lead to a 
war, and as soon as it broke out, Chiha considered the Arab resistance a necessity and 
a matter of life or death, hence opposing to the idea of a military truce. (Chiha 1960, 
103-102) 
However, Chiha soon gave in to the reality of Israel, suggesting a peaceful 
solution based on three articles such as; the internationalization of Jerusalem, 
humanitarian solution to the cause of the refugees, international guarantee of the Arab 
Israeli borders (Chiha, 1960, 182). This was a peaceful solution that Chiha wanted to 
implement only on the political level without tapping into the economy. The greatest 
fear of Chiha was the economic power of Israel. As such, he perceived that the 
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economic peace with Israel meant "Lebanon’s destruction" (Traboulsi, 1999, 285). 
This fear uncovers the reasons that were behind Chiha’s opposition to the inception of 
Israel. As such, he differs from his peers of the Christian political team who went as 
far as contemplating the identification of the Lebanese experience with the Israeli one, 
whereas his perception was generated from economical fears. He warned us of its 
economy that cannot survive without a huge production capable of destroying 
everything. In addition, Israel has a diverse commerce through its international 
relationships, which "would form a challenge to all the projects, the ports, the trades, 
the agencies, and all the professions that involves a certain service" (Chiha, 1962, 17).  
Chiha always determined his position on foreign policy based on his social 
class.  He was not biased to a specific country. He did not even show animosity 
towards the government of General Petain during the Nazi occupation of France. On 
the contrary, he took more of a neutral position during the war between the allies and 
the axis powers in World War II. He had some remarks on the allies’ camp, which 
joined the Soviet Union. This proves Chiha’s stand on social classes when it comes to 
foreign policy. Chiha did not show any enmity towards the external political field as 
opposed to the one he showed to the Soviet Union. This enmity was not focused on 
remarks about the "comprehensiveness" of the "Soviet" system as much as it was on 
its radical economic structure, which completely contradicted the intellectual system 
of Chiha. As such, it is not strange anymore to conclude that Chiha who solicited the 
French protection at his beginnings, called at the end of his days to join the Western 
alliance’s headed by the United States since Chiha saw in it a great force under which 
a country of inter-sharing minorities could seek protection.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HARIRI’S THOUGHTS ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Conceptual Frame 
The analysis of Rafik Hariri’s thoughts will depend mainly on the official 
political positions of the Lebanese-Saudi billionaire that were either directly 
expressed through his statements, or revealed through the attitudes of the governments 
he headed. This is in addition to a series of announcements, statements, press 
interviews, through which he expressed his economic, political, philosophical and 
ideological convictions. However, the analysis of "Hariri’s" discourse cannot be 
limited to what Hariri said or what has been said on his behalf. This analysis should 
be accompanied firstly with a reading of his positions based on their chronological 
frame, and secondly through approaching these positions on the practical level, and 
diagnosing whether or not the attitudes of Hariri moved from theory to execution.  
Therefore, the analysis of "Hariri’s" discourse will start with the sentence that 
he became famous for, especially after his assassination: "Do not believe everything 
that your ears hear, believe only half of what your eyes see, and leave the other half to 
your brain. Your brain is the filter that ultimately leads to the knowledge of truth…" 
(Rafik Hariri’s website). Consequently, since Hariri talked about the brain as a 
necessary tool that leads to knowledge of truth, the analysis of Hariri’s positions will 
also rely on the "brains" that used to surround him, mainly his team of consultants. 
Therefore, the study will attempt to investigate their opinions about the controversial 
causes, through diagnosing their writings and behaviors or through interviewing the 
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ones who have accepted to discuss Rafik Hariri’s thoughts, and did not attempt 
avoiding the interviews. 
Many people consider that the first political appearance of Rafik Hariri was in 
that speech he delivered at the American University of Beirut graduation ceremony in 
1991. However, Hariri had officially expressed his political and economic vision for 
Lebanon before that date, specifically during the convention of "Ta’ef" congress in 
1989. The briefcase that Hariri roamed and negotiated with in the corridors of the 
congress, included solution plans for the Lebanese parties participating in "Ta’ef", it 
also contained a solution that was very specific to Hariri. As such, this paper-project 
represents the first official expression of Hariri’s aspirations. Most importantly, it 
affirms Hariri’s power in formulating the final version of the national reconciliation 
charter, known as "Ta’ef" Accord. Consequently, Hariri becomes its real ‘godfather’ 
of "Ta’ef", not because the congress was held in the hotel that he himself had built, 
but also because the agreement was almost identical to the contents of the paper that 
he had presented. Therefore, this solution will always be the point of departure for 
analyzing Hariri’s discourse in any of the upcoming issues that we will treat. 
5.2 Lebanon’s Identity 
 
The solution plan that Hariri presented to the participants of "Ta’ef" congress 
mentions that Lebanon is a "sovereign free independent country with a united land 
and people… and it is a country of Arab belonging and identity". This is an 
affirmation of the Arabic identity of Lebanon that Hariri underscored with a high 
level of importance along with the "national preservation of co-existence". It is also "a 
unifying Arab responsibility since Lebanon forms the most righteous example to 
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solve the Arabs most important cause: Palestine" (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:136)7. In this 
definition, Hariri affirms the Arab identity of Lebanon, while before, it was with an 
"Arab face" in the 1943 charter. However, this affirmation upgraded the Lebanese 
example to a higher level that would make of Lebanon a solution to the Palestinian 
cause. What is meant here by the Lebanese example is that Lebanon is a multi-
confessional country, whereby different confessions are able to cohabit with one 
another. As such, Lebanon becomes the Arabs’ responsibility because its success will 
make of it the most suitable example for solving the Palestinian cause whereby Jews , 
Palestinian Christians and Muslims can cohabit together the same way the Lebanese 
confessions coexist. Of course, we do not know what made Hariri consider a country 
that had just recently come out of a bloody sectarian war, the third in its history, as the 
most suitable example for Palestine. However, what is important in this definition is 
that it highlights the similarity of Hariri’s view with the one that considers Lebanon as 
a group of minorities and confessions. This is clearly reflected in his statement 
"maintaining the coexistence is the number one mission of the country", since the 
"confessions remain the essence of Lebanon’s existence". (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:136)8 
This definition will accompany Hariri throughout his years. It will always 
come along with the ideological background of Hariri during his youth as being 
described as "an Arab nationalist who liked Abdel Nasser and who lived through the 
Lebanese experience in the 60s and liked it as well". (personal Interview with Daoud 
Al Sayegh).  In spite of this, what is striking in Hariri’s definition is that it came 
exempt from any indication about the finality of the Lebanese entity, unlike what 
appeared in "Ta’ef" accord. Consequently, it is worthy to note that the political 
                                                 
7 A draft resolution submitted by Rafik Hariri at “Ta’ef” congress” on September 29, 1989 
8 A draft resolution submitted by Rafik Hariri at “Ta’ef” congress” on September 29, 1989 
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program of the "Future Movement", which reiterated the confirmation of Lebanon’s 
Arabism and its Arab belonging, did not make any note of the finality of Lebanon’s 
entity (Tayyar Al-Moustaqbal, 14). This means that the "finality of the entity" did not 
fall inadvertently from the solution plan of Hariri, but it was rather deliberate, 
especially that Dar Al-Ifta’ had long preceded "Ta’ef" agreement in announcing the 
finality of the Lebanese entity in 1983 (Al Sayiegh 2002, 27). Thus, any later 
confirmation from Hariri about this issue during his governmental mandate came as a 
confirmation of the contents of "Ta’ef" agreement and nothing more. 
Lebanon is a country that relies on free liberal economy. This sentence 
mentioned in the constitution was mentioned also in the solution plan that Hariri 
presented in "Ta’ef". It indicates that the liberal economic identity of Lebanon is one 
the ingredients of its existence. Perhaps, Hariri’s intervention in the farewell session 
at the cabinet during president Hrawi’s mandate is the best way to express Lebanon’s 
economic identity as per the Lebanese billionaire. In this session, Hariri counted the 
achievements of the common mandate between him and Hrawi, to conclude that it 
succeeded in making a qualitative change in the concept of "Lebanonization", arguing 
that it used to be synonymous to internal fighting, wars and destruction, but this 
concept then became related to building, construction, renewal and self-confidence 
(Njeim, 2006, Vol11:137)9. Nevertheless, Hariri’s specific definition of 
"Lebanonization" makes his economic choices an act of determination, which means 
that it constitutes an implicit confession that the economic identity is not the result of 
inevitable destiny but a pledge of human determination. With this definition, it is up 
to us to ask about the reason for Hariri’s insistence to keep the constitutional text that 
determines the economic identity of Lebanon as a matter of destiny. This insistence 
                                                 
9 last Cabinet meeting in President Hrawi Mandate on December 19, 1998 
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on keeping the economic liberalism in the constitutional text is nothing but a willful 
act by Hariri to determine the economic role of Lebanon in compatibility with his 
vision, apart from the suitability of this role with the recent circumstances. This is 
much clearly reflected later when discussing the economic discourse of Hariri.   
5.3 The political Vision 
 
In his definition of the political system, Hariri did not stray from the Lebanese 
traditions, whether with regards to sectarianism as an essential cornerstone of he 
system, or the one that makes eliminating sectarianism from Lebanese people mind an 
indispensable condition to start eliminating political confessionalism. In accordance, 
there is no authority that contradicts the coexistence formula. The same appeared in 
Hariri’s solution plan, and afterwards in "Ta’ef" agreement, and then in Future 
Movement’s program. However, the dilemma here is that the constitution itself 
contradicts the "Lebanese formula". This contradiction is not exclusively the result of 
"Ta’ef" accord but it was created ever since the announcement of the constitution in 
1926, then elaborated in the national pact dated 1943, and ultimately reached its 
highest levels with the amendments of the second republic in 1989, which 
incorporated the national pact into the constitution.   
5.3.1 Sectarianism 
In his special paper at "Ta’ef" congress, Hariri expressed his perception 
towards the political system. He talked about a "democratic parliamentarian republic 
based on the respect of public freedoms, and primarily the freedom of opinion and 
belief as well as on separation of power, and on the social justice and the equality of 
rights and duties among all citizens without any discrimination or favoritism amid a 
free economic system to keep Lebanon a country of human dignity and civilized 
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ambition". (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:141)10. This is a definition that Hariri confirmed after 
8 years in the Future Movement’s program, which considered that the main conditions 
for an economic surge to be the consolidation of democracy, the freedoms, the state of 
law and the independence of judiciary. (Tayyar Al Moustaqbal, 36). These are 
conditions that Hariri enumerated again after he left the power in 1998. (Hariri 1999, 
63). It is necessary to approach this definition and these conditions in a practical 
manner, through comparing them with the steps taken by Hariri. First, however, it is 
necessary to stop by the inherited contradiction in Hariri’s behavior.  
In his special paper at "Ta’ef" congress, Hariri expressed his perception 
towards the political system. He talked about a "democratic parliamentarian republic 
based on the respect of public freedoms, and primarily the freedom of opinion and 
belief as well as on separation of power, and on the social justice and the equality of 
rights and duties among all citizens without any discrimination or favoritism amid a 
free economic system to keep Lebanon a country of human dignity and civilized 
ambition". (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:141). 11 This is a definition that Hariri confirmed after 
8 years in the Future Movement’s program, which considered that the main conditions 
for an economic surge to be the consolidation of democracy, the freedoms, the state of 
law and the independence of judiciary. (Tayyar Al Moustaqbal, 36). These are 
conditions that Hariri enumerated again after he left the power in 1998. (Hariri 1999, 
63). It is necessary to approach this definition and these conditions in a practical 
manner, through comparing them with the steps taken by Hariri. First, however, it is 
necessary to stop by the inherited contradiction in Hariri’s behavior.  
                                                 
10 A draft resolution submitted by Rafik Hariri at “Ta’ef” congress” on September 29, 1989 
11 A draft resolution submitted by Rafik Hariri at “Ta’ef” congress” on September 29, 198 
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This contradiction is reflected on the one hand in the bundle of the 
"democratic freedoms" and on the other hand in confirming the preservation of the 
"coexistence formula". Every time Hariri boasted about Lebanon’s democracy and 
freedom, sectarianism was there as it was described as a positive agent in this 
democratic system. As such, the sects are the "essence of Lebanon’s existence" 
(Njeim, 2006, Vol8:136), and the Lebanese society "is distinguished with 
sectarianism and coexistence since a long time… Therefore, any patronage of the 
public affairs must take into this factor consideration". Also, all the texts from the 
constitution and inside the government and its institutions must also take this factor 
into consideration". (Tayyar Al Moustaqbal, 16).  
Here it is up to us to ask how Hariri expected that "the Lebanese people be 
equal in front of law while they equally enjoyed their civil, political and social rights 
… without discrimination" (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:140)? Especially since preserving the 
"coexistence formula" did not allow him to apply Article 95, as it was amended in 
"Ta’ef" accord, which limits the sectarian quotas only in the first category jobs. Take 
in consideration that this article, which is classified as "interim" contradicts in itself 
the logic of citizenship as long as it specifies jobs within narrow sectarian 
frameworks.   
In his quest to eliminate the political sectarianism, Hariri delegated the 
mission to a "national council" headed by the president, the prime minister and the 
Speaker of and a number of other members. Upon its formation, this council had to 
perform a number of procedures, the most prominent of which being to set a media 
policy "that helps to attain national intermingling", "not to dedicate certain 
employment positions for a certain sect", "to gradually eliminate provisions having a 
sectarian characteristic". This operation must also be crowned with a non sectarian 
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national electoral law (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:146). The vast majority of these hopes are 
mentioned in "Ta’ef" agreement. They were also repeated later by many Lebanese 
political movements and parties, including the Future Movement. However, the 
condition of all these provisions was to eliminate sectarianism from people’s souls 
before eliminating it from the constitution and the electoral law. As such, what it takes 
to eliminate the political sectarianism "is not the honest acceptance from everyone (all 
the sects), but their effective involvement in order to reach that goal" (Tayyar Al 
Moustaqbal, 19).  This means simply that all the sects, as political and social entities, 
must take the decision to eliminate their own existence. Otherwise, this issue will not 
be achieved.  
How would these sects be able to eliminate sectarianism? The answer is 
simple: by eliminating the sectarian exploitation that "is the sole culprit of all 
troubles. There were also other distortions that came to weaken this national structure, 
the protection of which under the pretext of freedom and a free system became 
insufficient". (Tayyar Al Moustaqbal, 20).  Hereby, sectarianism is not Lebanon’s 
predicament but the exploitation of sectarianism. Hence, any tampering with articles.9 
and 10 of the constitution is prohibited, regardless of their contradiction with the 
simplest rules of justice and absolute freedom that the constitution mentions. In this 
respect, Hariri goes beyond the theoretical frame. He was the one that objected to the 
optional civil marriage law. He refused to sign it under the pretext that the issue was 
raised from outside the approved agenda. This was considered in breach of the 
constitution despite the fact that the majority of the cabinet members voted in favor of 
the proposed law. Hariri’s position about the law of civil marriage manifested his 
desire not to stand against the religious authorities. This is also reflected in his support 
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to the religious authorities’ stance to introduce religious education in the official 
educational curriculum, with the right of each sect to teach its religion its own way.  
This complicity with the sectarian status was not limited to clerics, but it also 
extended to the politicians whereby Hariri did not hesitate to confess that the financial 
waste was necessary to preserve the national union (Iskandar 2007, 85). Although 
sectarianism appears to be one of Hariri’s political tools, it was different when it came 
to his team of work, whereas he used to be secular more than he apparently seemed 
(personal interview with Ghazi Youssef). A simple look at his team of work could 
confirm this issue.  
The most prominent sectarian transformation for Hariri came after the 2000 
elections, which set him up as a sole Sunni leader since he won the elections beating 
all other remaining Sunni leaders. Nevertheless, it is hard to spot direct sectarian 
expressions used by Hariri. He managed to portray the political campaign launched 
against him while being in the opposition, as a campaign against the Sunni, but 
without saying it bluntly. As an example, he named his electoral list Beirut’s 
Decision. On the surface, the electoral campaign looked void of any sectarian indices. 
However, it effectively instigated the Sunnis to retake their own decision from 
Christian President Emile Lahoud along with the security regime who confiscated it 
from them. On the other hand, it was limited to the security frame, considering that 
the one who confiscated this decision is the security system, which has no religion 
and no confession.   
 
5.3.2 Legislative Authority 
Hariri’s position regarding the electoral divisions was also subjected to 
diligence in explaining its nature and whether it was influenced by the sectarian 
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dimension. It is known that Hariri supported the idea of considering the governorate, 
"Mohafatha", as an electoral district. However, after reconsidering the electoral 
divisions, he honestly expressed his visions by calling for having 11 mixed sectarian 
electoral governorates (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:145). He then repeated this request in 2004 
in one of his encounters with the head of the Syrian security and intelligence regime 
general Rustom Ghazali (Al Joumhouriya newspaper).12 Additionally, Hariri always 
objected to divide Beirut into districts. He even alleged that the electoral law in 2000 
was aimed at undermining his political weight because it divided Beirut into three 
electoral districts.   
These positions led to the belief that Hariri was keen on sectarian diversity 
inside each governorate, since that would assure him a demographic predominance, 
which in turn would allow him to reap the biggest number of seats in more than one 
governorate. The same goes for his refusal to divide Beirut into three districts, since 
this would lead to the dispersion of the Sunni voice. These accusations are enhanced 
by the absence of proportional-based electoral concept in Rafik Hariri’s principles. As 
such, it is hard to find positions that back and support proportional electoral law either 
from Hariri’s side or from the team members surrounding him. In addition, Hariri’s 
secret meetings with the Syrian leaders uncover his opposition to the proportional law 
because it enabled the birth of political and economic stability (Al Joumhouriyah 
newspaper). In addition, while Future Movement affirmed the importance of political 
parties’ existence, as a need to achieve political and educational revival, it did not 
indicate in any way the necessity to rely on electoral proportionality as mean to 
enhance the role of political parties in the parliament (A Nation Program 22). As such, 
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neglecting the proportional law was not an innocent act. It was rather deliberate; 
especially since the proportional law often leads to the breaking the monopoly of 
sectarian representation, in the face of the majority law in medium and large districts. 
However, the refusal of proportionality was not only limited to Hariri. It was also 
shared with most of the sectarian leaders. Hariri distinguished himself from them, in 
the fact that he didn’t use the proportional law as a "negotiable card" threatening to 
consider Lebanon one electoral district, just to enhance his electoral chances.  
Based on the majority system, the medium and large districts allowed Hariri to 
expand his presence in the parliament one round after the other. He succeeded in 2000 
to keep his opponents out, especially in Beirut.  Hariri’s interest in reaching the 
parliament with the biggest possible number of seats was due to his conviction of the 
parliament’s capacity to put obstacles to his economic projects. Even if we took into 
consideration the analysis that marginalizes the parliamentary role, arguing that 
decisions were not taken inside the constitutional institutions but rather outside, i.e. 
Syrian hegemony 2006, 277), this does not deny that the parliament was one of the 
institutional arenas used by the Syrian regime to put pressure on Lebanese politicians. 
Hereby, it’s very logical that political and sectarian leaders were seeking to enhance 
their position in the parliament in order to ensure that it will not be used against them, 
or at least to have the ability to strike back in the same arena.  
Apart from analysis, what is certain is that Hariri wanted to "theoretically" 
enhance the legislative authority through a bundle of reforms, the most prominent of 
which is the separation of the parliament membership from the ministerial 
membership, and to specify the mandate of the speaker of the parliament to two 
renewable years (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:145). However, this was before Hariri entered 
the ‘heaven’ of governance. Afterwards, it is sufficient to say that none of Hariri’s 
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governments seriously posed the separation of powers issue. Reducing the Speaker of 
the parliament’s mandate into two renewable years was not approved by "Ta’ef" 
accord. This point was not to be tackled later because it was considered to be 
tampering with the political rights of the Shiite sect. This was also the same with 
respect to the right to disband the parliament. Hariri suggested moving the authority 
of disbanding parliament from the president of the republic to the cabinet that is able 
to take such a decision based on having the absolute majority (Njeim, 2006, 
Vol8:145). 
 
5.3.3 Executive Authority 
It is known that "Ta’ef" agreement stripped the president from essential 
authorities and placed most of them under the custody of the cabinet. This was 
Hariri's vision. The Lebanese-Saudi billionaire had suggested that the parliamentary 
consultations be binding to the president when it comes to appointing the prime 
minister. It comes as no surprise that he apologized for not forming the government in 
1998 taking as an excuse the breaching of article 53 after a big number of deputies 
delegated to the president Lahoud the authority to appoint the prime minister 
(Iskandar 2007, 67). The mandatory parliamentary consultations were not Hariri’s 
sole idea which had appeared later in "Ta’ef" accord. As such, the formation of the 
government as well as the agenda of the cabinet became the shared responsibility of 
both presidents. As for the executive authority, it was assigned to a full cabinet.  Its 
quorum would not be fulfilled unless with two thirds of members present and 
decisions are taken by simple majority.  
Hariri did not mind consensual authority. He even lived through it during the 
mandate of President Hrawi, where the concept of "Troika" was created. The "Troika" 
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resulted in sharing the mandate among the three presidents (Republic, Parliament, and 
Cabinet) on the executive decisions level. This led to the sharing of the administrative 
nominations, the economic projects, and the national councils. It is sufficient to say 
that at the dawn of 1994, the Court of Accounts announced that 58% of the contracts 
between companies and a number of ministers went as consensual contracts (Wakim 
1998, 80). In accordance, the "Troika" turned the government into a "cash cow", 
while sharing the power resulted in a great public waste.  
However, Hariri clashed with consociationalism during the mandate of 
President Emile Lahoud. Lahoud came into power with a vision that drastically 
contradicts drastically Hariri’s vision, especially on the economic level. Accordingly, 
they coexisted compulsively between 2000 and 2004. This ended in a dramatic way 
when the security team close to Lahoud was accused with the assassination of Hariri. 
Nevertheless, one would not find in all Hariri’s official and media statements any 
clear direct expression of this compulsive coexistence between him and the president. 
Most often, Hariri expressed his resentment towards Lahoud through a number of 
journalists, even amid the political campaign against him when he refused to form the 
government in 2004 and when he was accused of being behind the UN Security 
Council resolution 1559. Therefore, the books that were published after the 
assassination of Hariri best express the tense relationship between Hariri and Lahoud. 
Perhaps the "incident of the military beach club" testifies to the massive aversion 
between the two men, when Lahoud invited Hariri to the military beach resort at 6 
AM to convey his economic and political vision.  
Did Hariri strive to achieve the political reform and translate his words into 
action? The numbers reveal the opposite. The numbers reveal that during his mandate, 
many of the TV stations closed down using the law implementation as an excuse, 
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while other stations obtained license before even being established. The numbers 
reveal that the desired freedom and justice were not achieved during a mandate that 
did not hesitate from banning private channels from broadcasting news bulletins in 
1997. These numbers reveal that democracy came up with a consensual formula based 
on the distribution of governmental revenues between the sectarian leaders, while the 
government suffered from budget deficit. Numbers reveal that none of the political 
reforms that "Ta’ef" outlined was achieved; neither the national council to eliminate 
political sectarianism saw the light, nor the senate council found its way into the 
constitution. Numbers have a lot to reveal, however numbers are "a matter of vantage 
point" as former Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss says. So, on the one hand all these 
numbers represent a conviction against Hariri. However, on the other hand, these 
numbers represent the definite proof of the Syrian regime’s intervention in the 
Lebanese political map, preventing Hariri’s aspirations for reform.  
5.4 The Economic vision 
As argued throughout the thesis, Hariri always assured the liberal nature of the 
Lebanese economy as well as the sacredness of individual ownership. These were 
already mentioned earlier. Hariri had a clear method since the beginning: 
Reconstruction. Since the Israeli invasion in 1982, ever since the day his bulldozers 
removed the piles of destruction from the centre of Beirut, the dream of reconstructing 
the Downtown Beirut was haunting Hariri. This had come along with a vision that 
matched his aspirations to bring back the Lebanese economy to its previous state as a 
touristy and commercial utility able to surpass Dubai that only stood out after the Gulf 
invasion in 1990 (Bkassini 2009, 40).  
5.4.1 Reconstruction 
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During "Ta’ef" congress, Hariri clearly expressed the features of his economic 
program that relied on reconstructing what was destroyed during the civil war. By 
then, Hariri associated reconstruction with a development policy, which included 
budgetary plans of five points guaranteeing the government to achieve its social 
duties, such as education, pension, and health coverage. (Njeim, 2006, Vol8:145). 
However, the ‘rosy’ promises of Hariri soon changed their course after the Karami 
government faced the collapse of the Lebanese pound against the US dollar. Hariri 
launched his first governmental programs announcing that "to move along quickly 
with construction does not at all mean the negligence of balanced and long-term 
development goals" (Njeim, 2006, Vol10:2913). Here, it is important to notice the 
reference to the quickness in achieving reconstruction as opposed to the long-term 
period for achieving the developmental projects. Despite that, to achieve this goal, 
Hariri borrowed around 14 billion US Dollars. This goal was to be achieved in 2002, 
with predictions indicating that the income per capita will double by then, and the 
average growth rate will reach up to 9%. As for the public debt, it was predicted to 
increase to 84% in 1995, then to decrease to 39% in 2002. Based on this, it was 
estimated that the inflation would decrease from 15% to 4% in 1996, and the effective 
value of the banking interests would not cross over 3% (Gaspard 2004, 263).  
These were ambitious numbers announced by Hariri, along with a bundle of 
measures that aimed to regulate "expenses, as much as possible, without tampering 
with the authorities’ duties towards citizens", in addition to the increase of revenues 
through the enhancement of collection, either the government taxes, custom fees, fees 
for changing property ownership, or fees for occupying public property (Njeim, 2006, 
                                                 
13 Ministerial statement draft discussed in the parliament on November 9, 1992 
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Vol10:2914). However, Hariri did not wait too long to confirm the governmental need 
for loans and international donations to achieve his announced goals. Additionally, he 
again related the enhancement of living standards (increase of wages) with the launch 
of the construction workshops (Njeim, 2006, Vol10:5615).  
 
5.4.2 Loans 
However, the option of donations soon was omitted as an exclusive choice 
while loans were prescribed as an indispensable need. Hariri justified the decision of 
debt later by limiting the choices for an economic revival to three. The first choice 
was the choice of waiting, i.e. waiting for international donations however in vain as 
per Hariri, after noticing that the donating countries, except for France, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the Emirates, did not meet the needs of Lebanon as previously assumed. 
The second choice is the choice of the increase of taxes and fees along with a 
reduction of social and military expenses, hoping that these would lead to the riddance 
of the budget deficit and achieve a surplus that would later allow the reconstruction. 
As per Hariri, this choice would have led to an economic decline, as it was the case 
with some of the Western European countries. As for the third choice, it was none 
other but the choice of Hariri himself, that he named the choice of growth, 
development and construction. This choice was described as the one that is able to 
achieve prosperity, social care, building of armed forces and reconstruction.  
Nevertheless, all these economic goals called for the reliance on local resources, and 
specifically "local loans and the inflow of capitals from abroad, along with seeking 
continually and actively to obtain international financial help as well as obtaining 
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15 Q and A session at the parliament on December 5, 1993 
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loans from the international capital markets" (Hariri 1999, 27-29). Hariri made debt 
an inevitable matter. Yet even if we give in to this logic, this does not mean at all that 
we can overlook the high interest rates that were charged by the Lebanese banks in 
Lebanese pound. The average interest rates in Lebanese pound reached the limit of 
40% in 1992, then settled at 10% in 2004 (Bank of Lebanon). The result of these high 
interest rates was that Lebanon was obtaining loans from banks with an average 
interest that exceeded the international average of around 10% (Gaspard 2004, 334). 
In result, the public debt reached around 32% of the total public expenses for the 
years ranging between 1993 and 1998. (Hariri 1999, 50) 
The plan that Hariri put and the overly optimistic numbers he provided were 
not in any case identical to what things turned out to be in 2002. The national income 
growth stopped at 3.7%, the gross annual income per capita only rose to 0.7%, and the 
unemployment rate remained as is (Gaspard 2004, 264). In the meantime, the public 
debt rose from 3 billion dollars by the end of 1992 to 18 billion dollars by the 
beginning of the summer of 1998 (Iskandar 2007, 97). Hariri attributed this failure, 
upon leaving office, to the financial squandering that was related to the sectarian 
structure of the Lebanese system. After he came back to the power, he attributed the 
financial failures to the financial policies undertaken by government of Prime 
Minister Salim Al-Hoss, which resulted in a regression of the economic growth while 
the public debt increased by 3.4 billion dollars during 2 years (Iskandar 2007, 107). 
However, George Corm, the finance minister of Al-Hoss cabinet, indicated that Hariri 
must thank Al-Hoss government because it has succeeded in reducing the average 
interest rates from 22% to 14%. This government had also achieved an increase in the 
income taxes average, raising the rate from 10% to 20% as opposed to the previous 
situation that limited the progressive tax on the highest income range for up to 10%. 
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This government made all the preparations to adopt the value added tax. It also paid 
all the accumulated dues of the state treasury to the private sector, as well as what it 
could pay to municipalities and social security fund noting that these dues had not 
appeared in the debt account, though it amounted to billions of dollars. According 
Corm, Hariri did not dare to take these measures. Most importantly, all of these 
measures were part of the conditions that were set in Paris I and II conferences. (Al-
Akhbar Newspaper16).   
However, we repeat again that the numbers in Lebanon are just a point of 
view. Apart from the reasons that stand behind the increase of public debt, it remains 
certain that the banking sector achieved and is still achieving large profits due to the 
high average interest rates compared to the average interest rates in the international 
market.   
5.4.3 Banking Sector 
The prosperity of the banking sector was greatly related to the economic 
policy that Hariri’s governments followed. This policy centralized its efforts towards 
stabilizing the exchange rate of the Lebanese Pounds versus the US dollars, protecting 
the gold coverage of the Lebanese pound, and attracting foreign capitals to the sector. 
Hariri made sure to correlate between the inflow of the foreign capitals and the 
decrease of the average interest rates, as such making the increase of the foreign 
capitals a condition for lowering the interest rates. He considered that this issue will 
only be achieved through the renewal of trust in the Lebanese economy by assuring 
"the primary privacies of the Lebanese economy based on the encouragement of 
individual initiatives, freedom of capital movement, freedom of transfer, legislative 
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and tax stability, banking secrecy and market economy" (Hariri 1999, 64-68).  
Hariri’s remarks came based on the economic policy that Al-Hoss government 
adopted. Al-Hoss government succeeded in reducing the interest rates on the 
Lebanese Pound, and suggested – inside the banking sector – to reduce the reliance on 
transfers and internal capitals to cover the deficit, in addition to imposing taxes on the 
income coming from abroad, as well as on the interests resulting from the banking 
deposits without removing the banking secrecy law adopted in Lebanon since 1995 
(Iskandar 2007, 105).  
However, Hariri who reduced later the banking interest rates, and imposed a 
tax of 5% on all the interests paid on deposits, thus abiding by the resolutions of Paris 
II (Iskandar 2007, 126), was always very rigid when it came to the reduction of 
interest rates. Accordingly, he was firm in his reply to the deputy Nassib Lahoud who 
was asking to "seize the nearest possible opportunity to sit with the banks…. to 
discuss with them the future of this debt, to reach a program which restructured the 
debt in a specific timeframe, and reconsidered interest rates while taking into 
consideration on the one hand, the vital interests of the banking sector, and on the 
other hand the capacities of the treasury". By then, Hariri’s reply was that asking 
banks to reduce interest rate would not be possible until a bundle of political and 
administrative reforms were achieved. (Website of the Democratic Renewal party). 
Hariri’s rigidity concerning interest rates is described by Corm to be part of a deal 
with the banks, stating that banks should abstain from speculating the Lebanese pound 
in order to ensure fiscal stability, in return for the government to disregard high 
interest rates, especially on the local currency, in spite of it being the currency of the 
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internal debt. In another words, the banking sector was able to double its profits in a 
continuous manner at the expense of the state treasury.  (Al-Akhbar news paper17).   
5.4.4 Trade, Commerce and Services 
The encouraging economic policies for the banking sector were also applied 
on the trade and tourism sectors. Hariri was clear from the start about the correlation 
between reconstruction and the launch of tourism (10-29). He then insisted again on 
the importance of encouraging and developing the sector of services "starting from 
the successes that we achieved in the past and concentrating on the benefits that we 
could draw from Lebanon’s geographic location and nature". The services that Hariri 
talks about here focus on "our integrated touristy and environmental resources", "the 
Lebanese tourist market", and "the intensification of cooperation with international 
commercial centers such as the Emirate of Dubai". (Hariri 1999, 78).  
In his first ministerial statement Hariri expressed his strive to impose a more 
just taxing system. However, by the end of his first mandate he was proud to 
announce that the fiscal laws issued by his government has noted "a significant 
reduction of the average taxes on salaries, wages, companies profits, self-employed 
and individual institutions, from around a maximum of 50% in the year 1990 down to 
around up to 10% and without any additions starting year 1994". He also noted the 
decrease of taxes on the companies’ profits from 12% down to 5%. The reduction also 
included property taxes as well as taxes on inheritance and donation fees. There were 
additional reductions for "Lebanese holdings and Lebanese companies that are active 
abroad", in addition to setting "new custom fees in order to reduce the fees and their 
levels" (Hariri 1999, 44-45). Despite this, Hariri did not only settle with these 
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measures. In 2000, he again called for his government budget to adopt encouraging 
policies for the private sector through adopting the policy of the ‘open skies’, 
reducing the customs barriers, eliminating the non-customs obstacles, work on 
marketing and promoting the Lebanese products and services, and insist again on the 
importance of the legislative stability. (Njeim, 2006, Vol13:13118)  
Having promised to combat monopoly and inflation, Hariri did not 
theoretically budge in this direction up until the recommendations of Paris II 
conference, which recommended eliminating the exclusive trade agencies. Hariri 
worked on issuing a law that prohibited such exclusivity. However, he then backed 
out on this law, which remained void of content noting that some press reports 
indicated that Hariri’s withdrawal was the result of a deal that allowed a number rich 
people in his entourage to obtain their shares of these agencies (Al-Akhbar news 
paper19).  
At this level, it would become unnecessary to search for the size of commerce, 
tourism and banking services in the Lebanese economy, since it is sufficient to say 
that Hariri categorized development, construction, agriculture, industry, and tourism 
in the same section. This came in the context of specifying the size of the 
governmental expenditure and the modality of distributing it between 1992 and 1998, 
knowing that the contribution size of each of the above mentioned sectors in the gross 
national product was highly different. For example, in 1997, the industrial sector 
formed only 13% while the agriculture sector 6%, while the remaining figures were 
divided between the services (other services 22%, public administrations services 
11%, commerce 22%, construction 11%, housing 8%). As for labor, they were 
                                                 
18 Ministerial statement draft discussed in the parliament on October 31 2000 
19 Abu Zaki, R. (2010). Al wikalat al hasria bakia bakia, Al Akhbar, retrieved from 
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distributed in the same year as follows; 9% for agriculture, 15% for industry, 11% for 
construction, and 65% for services (Gaspard 2004, p. 244).  
5.4.5 Industry and Agriculture 
The contributions of both the agriculture and industrial sectors in the Lebanese 
economy were poor. This came in contrast with the repeated promises of Hariri to 
support both these sectors, especially during his first ministerial statement. His 
promises did not find their way to execution. On the contrary, every time Hariri talked 
about supporting the productive sectors, he included tourism-based jobs in his 
economic dictionary; he was keen on "having the necessary financing for the 
production sectors at reduced costs". He called to move from the quantitative to the 
qualitative production on the agricultural and industrial levels. He also called to 
gradually transfer the agricultural subsidies from being a direct support on specific 
types to being an indirect support to increase employment opportunities in agriculture 
(Hariri 1999, 44). As such, he planned to cancel the subsidization of beetroot. He 
succeeded in achieving this goal in 2001. This resulted in the elimination of the 
cultivation of this type of product which used to assure employment opportunities to 
many families. This also resulted in raising Lebanon’s import level of sugar of 15%  
(Al-Akhbar newspaper20). In return, Hariri succeeded in concretizing his promise of 
encouraging the export of agricultural products through the "Export Plus" Program by 
Idal’s project for supporting investment projects.  
On the industrial level, we can arguably say that Hariri was the first enemy of 
industrialists through his demands and decisions to lower the customs fees. This 
negatively reflected on the ability of the Lebanese industry to compete with the 
foreign merchandise. Hariri advocated more than once his economic policy that was 
                                                 
20 Article published on November 19 2011 
82 
disliked by the industrialists, announcing that "we are not in a progressive industrial 
society. We have factories that include tens of thousands of workers, yet we do not 
have any factories that earn money". Based on this, Hariri concludes that 
"encouraging the industry is not a slogan", and this would not be through increasing 
the customs fees on exports, hereby protecting national industries, but rather through 
"removing the obstacles in the face of investments", and also through working on 
industries that keep pace with modern times such as software industry"  (Njeim, 2006, 
Vol14:521).  
5.4.6 Privatization 
The investments that Hariri talked about are a sign of his support to the private 
sector as a pathway to enhance the national income (Njeim, 2006, Vol13:13122). 
While he was very prudent with privatization when he was on the opposition side, he 
quickly invited to adopt it once he was back in the power. He had announced his 
support to the policy of privatization provided the circumstances have matured and 
become suitable. Therefore, selling the mobile telecommunication sector called for 
waiting to see what new technological advancements would bring about, and the 
sector of electricity should not be sold before the enhancement of power plants. He 
also refused to sell the public sectors in order to cover the public debt amid a slow and 
shrunken economic cycle, under the pretext of the necessity of liberating the economy 
by committing to the privatization process (Hariri 1999, 74). However, at the moment 
he returned to power, he went on and called for the adoption of privatization of 
projects and utilities that would be of benefit to the economy and the citizens, on the 
condition that the revenues will be used to lower the public debt.. (Njeim, 2006, 
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Vol13:13123).  He soon commenced preparing a law for privatization to be adopted in 
June 2002. His plans were to privatize the mobile telecom and electricity sectors. Yet, 
his plans soon crashed due to the political clash between him and President Emile 
Lahoud (Iskandar 2007, 124).  
The pretext of Hariri to privatize the governmental sectors focused on the 
logic of waste that the government is suffering due to the rehabilitation of sectors that 
have cost the government hefty amounts, while the services of these sectors remained 
substandard and their financial revenues remained low to the extent that they have 
become a burden on the state budget. This logic could be argued when it comes to the 
electricity sector. However, the privatization of mobile sector was incomprehensible, 
since the latter used to bring profits to the state treasury, especially that Al- Hariri 
himself had indicated that selling this sector should not be done before the 
development of technology. As for the privatization of the electricity sector, it looks 
convincing if we calculate the debt that resulted from renovating this sector reaching 
around 11 billion dollars (Bkassini 2009, 87). Nevertheless, it’s important to take into 
consideration that Hariri bears the direct responsibility of the situation that the 
electricity sector in Lebanon (Electricité du Liban) has reached. Hariri insisted on 
dismissing the minister George Afram, who presented a project for renovating the 
electricity sector with a much lower cost than the project that Hariri himself adopted 
later. He assigned the execution of this mission to the former leader of the Lebanese 
Forces militia Elie Hobeika, and then to a leader in Amal movement Abdel Hamid 
Baydoun (Wakim 1998, 278).  This means that Hariri was involved when it came to 
quotas related to the sect and the party that led to the mismanagement of this sector. It 
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is our right to go further and say that "leading the electricity to failure" might have 
been a systematic plan to privatize it.  
5.4.7 Government’s Role 
The privatization that Hariri strove hard to achieve was an honest expression 
of his view towards the government and its roles. He was the one to talk in the 
beginning of his mandate that the government would not spare any effort to offer its 
services or to fight against any abuse against the law, while talking about the state of 
Bekaa (Njeim, 2006, Vol10:5724). Then, at the beginning of his second mandate, he 
held the deputies responsible for the deterioration of Bekaa conditions, using an 
excuse that they were not reporting the hardships of the residents to the government. 
(5-14). In Fact, Bekaa only saw the second half of Hariri’s promise i.e. the security 
presence to eliminate the planting of hashish, while the policy of balanced 
development drafted in Ta’ef remained unachieved. Neither did the project of 
building residences for limited income people was applied, nor did the social 
contributions for the government reached the acceptable limits. As such, the social 
security project for elders remained only an idea, as well as the project of health 
coverage. Hariri did not even hesitate to invite the civil society organizations to share 
the social responsibilities of the government, through carrying out "a bigger role in 
public schools, hospitals and humanitarian and social donation centers" (Hariri 1999, 
87). It is enough to say that the size of the government’s expenditure on the social 
contributions including the wasted funds such as the Council of South Lebanon, the 
funds for the return of the displaced and refugees did not exceed 19% between the 
years 1993-1998. On the other hand, the size of the expenditure on the debt service 
reached 32%, and the expenses of the three presidents’ affairs and a number of 
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ministries up to 11%. These are the numbers revealed by Hariri himself (Hariri, 1999, 
50). 
5.5 Foreign Policy 
 
Rafik Hariri associated the success of his economic vision to the peace project 
with Israel. Even if he indicated that his aspiration for the peace was a goal and not a 
bet, (Tayyar Al-Moustaqbal p. 28), most of the facts indicated that he based his 
numbers and economic aspirations upon the peace process and the circumstances that 
he wished would come along. Hariri, who came to the power in a regional moment 
which represented an intersection between Saudi Arabia, the United States and Syria, 
wailed a lot on the peace talks that were launched in Madrid. He always strove to 
employ his relations and international friends to serve this goal, to the extent that he 
became the actual ministry of foreign affairs of the Syrian system.   
It is unnecessary to say that "Ta’ef" accord did not directly indicate the 
resistance as one of the rights of the Lebanese people. It rather talked about the right 
to retrieve the territories with all the possible ways while committing to the 1949 truce 
agreement. This is exactly what appeared in the solution plan that Hariri presented in 
"Ta’ef" congress. Even the first ministerial statement of Hariri’s government did not 
mention the expression of resistance at all. It talked about holding on to the right of 
Lebanon as government and people to liberate the Lebanese territories with all the 
ways possible, based on the United Nations charter and the human rights law ( Njeim, 
2006, Vol10:29  ) 
The first time Hariri mentioned the word Resistance, was in 1993 after the 
Israeli aggression on Lebanon. This came in the frame of the government disownment 
of the resistance, whereby "despite the fact that confronting the aggressor and 
resisting the conqueror… is a lawful right, the certain desire of the government for 
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peace carried it towards the project of reconstruction". This was the government that 
was "never once with the policy of Katiyusha which are used outside delicate political 
considerations" ( Njeim, 2006, Vol10:8225  ) Most importantly, the Lebanese people 
refused that their country once again becomes the victim of a conflict for a Middle 
Eastern cause. This is a position that did not differ from the one taken by Hariri on the 
eve of signing on the 1996 April agreement, which some attribute to him. By then, he 
described Hezbollah as a problem that will not be solved by violence. He also aimed 
to promote equality between the Israeli and Lebanese civilians on each side of the 
borders since "we need to take care of them", and "we need to strive for a final 
solution for the region".  (Njeim, 2006, Vol 11:1626   ) 
Most importantly, the Lebanese people refused that their country once again 
becomes the victim of a conflict for a Middle Eastern cause. This is a position that did 
not differ from the one taken by Hariri on the eve of signing on the 1996 April 
agreement, which some attribute to him. By then, he described Hezbollah as a 
problem that will not be solved by violence. He also aimed to promote equality 
between the Israeli and Lebanese civilians on each side of the borders since "we need 
to take care of them", and "we need to strive for a final solution for the region". 
(Njeim, 2006, Vol13:13127).  
Hariri’s position came while the peace process was stumbling after the 
assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was very close to 
signing a peace agreement with the Syrian President Hafez Al-Asad. Hariri's attitude 
towards the efficiency of the resistance work changed after the achievement of 
liberating the south in 2000. As such, the government saluted the resistance of the 
                                                 
25 speech made in the opening ceremony of the Arab league summit in Damascus on June 30, 1993   
26 Press conference in Shtoura- Bekaa on April 24, 1996, in the presence of Nabih Berri, head of the       
parliament, Worner Christopher, secretary of state department.  
27 Ministerial statement draft discussed in the parliament on October 31 2000 
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Lebanese people and their sturdiness and patience, "assuring the refusal of the Israeli 
position that goes too far in occupying Shebaa farms and keeping hostages", and 
inviting to invest the achievements of the resistance in all the fields by considering it 
an example to follow in the process of fair and comprehensive peace". (Njeim, 2006, 
Vol13:13128).  No wonder that Hariri still betted on peace. He mostly believed that the 
Israeli withdrawal would ensure him the lost condition of security he suffered from in 
his first mandate, which would guarantee the prosperity of his economic plan that 
relies on the sector of services. Thus, he did not lose the faith in the fact that peace is 
the correct path; "the peace of the strong people and strength does not necessarily 
mean war and fighting, although it might mean just that. The strength means the 
strength of cooperation and solidarity". (Njeim 2006, Vol13:13129).    
Hariri’s bet was to face the Israeli challenges in the era of peace through the 
mutual economic and cultural solidarity between the Arab countries (Tayyar Al 
Moustaqbal, 39). His attitude with respect to the resistance did not differ concerning 
the "just" Palestinian cause, as he stood beside the Palestinian people and their right to 
return back to their land, yet while relying on the International community and the 
United Nations resolutions as a way to liberate Palestine. 
 
 
  
                                                 
28  Ministerial statement draft discussed in the parliament on October 31 2000 
29 Ministerial statement draft discussed in the parliament on October 31 2000 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Before starting to compare between Hariri and Chiha based on the facts that 
we have concluded from analyzing both discourses, we first need to go through some 
of the comparisons between Hariri and political personalities from Lebanon’s 
contemporary history, made by some authors and analysts. Comparing Hariri with 
political and intellectual personalities is not something new. Most of those whom 
wrote about Hariri or treated cases related to the Lebanese affairs have already 
compared him with other political and intellectual figures. After reviewing the 
published literature, it is evident that Hariri has been automatically compared to three 
personalities: Prime Minister of the Independence government Riad Al-Solh, the 
deputy Emile Boustani, prime minister of four governments Hussein Uwayni.  
6.1 Comparison between Hariri and Riad Al-Solh  
The journalist George Bkassini draws a comparison between Riad Al-Sold and 
Rafik Hariri. He reports on behalf of Samir Frangieh his wish in the year 1992 of 
Hariri to become a second Riad Al-Solh. By then, Hariri answered that he will be 
much more than this and what he will do will make the Lebanese people remember 
him for years to come (Bkassini, 2009, 19). Bkassini also reports on behalf of Hariri’s 
political consultant Daoud Al Sayegh that the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir used 
to liken Hariri to Riad Al-Solh (Bkassini 2009, 58). This comparison focused on 
presenting Hariri as a Pan-Arabist who believes in an Arabism that is able to coexist 
with the Lebanese idea. Thus, Hariri Arabism is based in the first place on the logic of 
economic integration between Arab countries as opposed to a traditional idea that 
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calls for political union and relies on military force. (Bkassini 2009, 20) In the context 
of comparison between both Sunni prime ministers, Bkassini indicates that Hariri’s 
proceeded to “Lebanonize” the Sunni confession as a continuation of what Riad Al-
Solh had done. He also reports on behalf of the cultural consultant of Hariri, Radwan 
Al Sayed that the Sunni confession in Lebanon had been based on people of power 
since thousands of years. They were always accused from minorities to be loyalist to 
the system, and had rarely shown any opposition to the authorities. Based on this, 
their support to the independence in 43 complemented their history since they were 
supportive of the legal government, provided that Lebanon becomes a part of the Arab 
nation. This is exactly what Rafik Hariri succeeded to achieve after “Ta’ef”, where he 
was able to reinstate the Sunni confession into the “Lebanese map” through their 
approval of “Ta’ef” agreement and through surpassing their disagreement with the 
Syrian system during the years of war. Bkassini concludes that Hariri succeeded to 
“Lebanonize” the Sunni confession without Islamizing Lebanon. (Bkassini 2009, 61-
62).  
 
6.2 Comparison between Hariri  and Emile Boustany 
The comparison with Emile Boustany (1907-1963) seems one of its kinds. It is not 
one of the frequently tackled comparisons, especially since Boustany is not 
considered one of the most famous personalities in the contemporary political history 
of Lebanon. This is a comparison that the economist Marwan Iskandar draws without 
setting any fixed rules or direct indications to it. He only settles with a quick narration 
of one of the most important political, economic and personal stages of the deputy 
Boustany without intending to compare these stages with what Hariri faced. However, 
Iskandar motivates the reader himself to make this comparison especially that writing 
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about Boustany came in the context of a book introducing Hariri. Iskandar himself did 
not hesitate to indicate that Hariri came to continue what destiny prevented Boustany 
from accomplishing. (Iskandar 2007, 21-39).  
Boustany is the son of one of Sidon’s villages “Al Dibbiyeh”. During his 
studies in the United States, he was influenced by Marxism. However, he soon 
discarded the socialist ideas he believed in during the years of the great depression 
starting from 1929. He then adopted the Liberalist economy after he succeeded to 
pave his way as a contractor through his work in the Gulf. Boustany started his 
professional life in an oil company in Iraq, which was executing a pipeline to move 
oil from Karkouk to Haifa. Similarly to this oil route, Boustany moved from Iraq to 
Haifa, after he had continued his studies in London to earn a degree in engineering. 
With the dawn of the year 1935, Boustany settled in Haifa after he established his 
personal engineering company. Two years after this, he got married and built his own 
house in Haifa. Afterwards, he established the CAT Company for contracting with a 
group of friends, benefiting from the consolidated relations with the oil company that 
he used to work at previously in Iraq. With CAT, Boustany succeeded in extending 
his hopes since his company became one of the most famous companies in the Middle 
East in the field of contracting, especially when it comes to oil facilities. The first 
construction projects in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi emirates held the prints of 
Boustany himself. With the end of the 90s, Boustany’s company had offices in more 
than one place in the world, from Syria to Lebanon, Pakistan and Britain. (Iskandar 
2007, 21-23).  
This success and economic prosperity is believed to have a direct political 
significance, whereby he succeeded in entering the Parliament in the early 50’s. 
Boustany played more than one role, whether through heading the foreign affairs 
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committee or through governmental reconstruction contracts his company took after 
the destruction that was caused by the earthquake in 1956. He also succeeded to cope 
with the political quake that Lebanon witnessed in 1958 following the revolution 
against the Presidency of Camil Chamoun (1952-1958) who was striving to engage 
Lebanon with the western alliance against the flourishing of Nassarite movement 
(footnote needed) in Lebanon and the Arab world. The success of Boustany came 
through his neutrality from conflicting parties. He stood at a distance from president 
Chamoun and Egyptian president Jamal Abdel Nasser whom he had built a friendship 
with after his refusing position with respect to the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt 
in 1956. (Iskandar 2007, 26) 
Despite the differences in their economic inclinations, the friendship between 
Abdel Nasser and Boustany was a reason for the tension in the relation between 
President Fouad Chehab (1958-1964) and Boustany. The former perceived 
Boustany’s ambitions to become a president as a danger to his mandate. Therefore, 
their relationship was tensed most of the times (Iskandar 2007, 28). However, 
Boustany’s ambitions to become president soon collided with destiny after he passed 
away in a tragic plane crash in 1963. This tragedy accident prevented the arrival of a 
president who is capable of joining between the revolutionary governments in the 
Arab world and the oil-producing countries in the Gulf, as per the analysis of 
Iskandar. He even goes further arguing that Boustany had the ability to stand in the 
face of the Soviet plans to dominate the Arab world (Iskandar 2007, 36-37).  
Accordingly, we can conclude from what has been presented that Iskandar 
wanted to draw a comparison between both political and economical figures, firstly 
with the common roots being Sidon, secondly with the ideological background that 
altered from socialism to capitalism, thirdly with the professional progression and the 
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accumulation of wealth through working in the contracting sector, hereby benefiting 
from the oil booming in the Gulf. Moreover, the comparison is manifested through 
Hariri and Boustani’s political power, despite the fact that they occupied different 
positions, also through their contribution to reconstruction - earthquake of 56 versus 
civil war- ,their ability to compromise between Anti West regimes and the oil-
producing countries, the repulsion between the politician coming from the world of 
economy and the military president -Fouad Chehab, Emile Lahoud-, and finally the 
absolute advocacy to the Liberal system as being the most successful system for 
Lebanon and all the countries of the world.  
 
6.3 Comparison between Hariri and Hussein Uwayni  
The comparison between Hariri and Hussein Uwayni goes back to a study 
prepared by the historian Fawaz Traboulsi, which he presented in 2007 during a 
conference in the University of London entitled (Saudi expansion: the Lebanese 
connection, 1924–1952). The study itself did not strive for comparison as much as it 
aimed to document the expansion of the Saudi power in the Lebanese political life in 
the period that preceded the independence and during the mandate of the president 
Bechara El Khoury.  Traboulsi listed the most important stages that Oueini passed 
through; from his beginnings as a young Arab nationalist being against the French 
mandate and belonging to an average family, to his immigration to Jeddah in Saudi 
Arabia where he formed his fortune through textile trading and then gold trade, and 
ending with a political position as a finance minister and then prime minister in the 
last year of the renewed mandate of the president Bechara El Khoury. Traboulsi 
presents Uwayni as the young man who was imprisoned for two months after he was 
accused for participating in the assassination of the minster of internal security in the 
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first government of the French mandate Assaad Khorshid. After he was released, 
Uwayni traveled to Jeddah, which was under the rule of Abdel Aziz Ben Saoud. He 
went there to work in the textile trade, and then he expanded his trading activity to 
include Palestine, where he opened a factory for textile in Haifa.  
This growing economic role allowed him to act as a mediator between the 
Sultan Najed Abdel Aziz Ben Saoud and the King of Al Hijaz Al Sharif Ali during the 
conflict between the Hachemite and the Saoud family. However, this mediation was 
not successful due to the military operation that Al Saoud family succeeded in, and 
consequently made Al Hijaz join their flag in 1926 and announce their Kingdom in 
1932. However, Uwayni succeeded in approaching Al Saoud family to become, at the 
beginning of the 1940th, the commercial agent of Al Saoud family as per the 
description of General Spears, the minister of Syria and Lebanon in the British 
government.  Uwayni, who was forbidden to enter the territories that were under the 
rule of the French mandate, soon became the representative of the French commercial 
interests in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia after his ban was removed.  
Upon his return to Lebanon in 1937, this commercial activity allowed him to 
establish Banque du Liban et D’Outre Mer –BLOM-. However, the essential turning 
point that contributed to the growth of his wealth came through the gold commercial 
operations. At that time, Beirut formed a center for these operations, where 20% of 
the international gold operations used to pass by. The size of the revenues from gold 
trade reached around 100 million dollars with the year 1951.  Hereby, he succeeded in 
doubling his fortune through his position as the finance minister in 1949, specifically 
after being the man behind the decision of linking the Lebanese pound to the gold 
standard, thus committing to the recommendations of Michel Chiha. It is enough to 
say here that the size of gold trade in 1946 was around 553 Kg and reached up to 89 
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thousand Kg around the year 1951, whereas Uwayni himself was responsible for the 
gold transactions between Banque Indochine of Jiddah and the Beirut branch. This 
enormous fortune allowed Uwayni to become part of the Christian Oligarchy that 
controls the essential joints of the Lebanese economy. Accordingly, Uwayni’s 
participation in the “Consortium”, the families that dominate the economic sectors, 
coincided with his investment in the fields that constitute the pillars of the Lebanese 
economy, whether in the banking sector through Banque du Liban et d’Outre Mer, or 
through tourism, or through the transportation sector by participating in establishing 
Lebanon’ airlines, or through the construction sector.   
Uwayni became a prime minister for the first time at the end of Bechara El 
Khoury’s renewed mandate. The road to the government palace was paved after he 
was elected a deputy during the 1947 election, which was named “Black May 
election” due to the “fraud” that tainted it. The goal of this fraudulent election was to 
form a parliament having a mission of endorsing the modification of the constitution 
in order to renew El Khoury’s mandate. Uwayni indeed committed to this, whereby 
he voted in favor of the renewal. Thus he got appointed as a finance minister in the 
first renewed government, and afterwards a prime minister in the last year of the same 
mandate. The government could not serve until the end of its renewed years, due to a 
popular opposition in 1951. Afterwards, Uwayni held the position of prime minister 
three consecutive times; however they were short in period. All of them came at the 
end of President Fouad Chehab’s mandate and the beginning of President Charles 
Helou’s mandate. (February 1964 –July 1965).  
The years that Uwayni passed in the ministry of finance and then as a prime 
minister were influential on the economic level, especially with respect to the 
liberation of economy whether in terms of commercial or financial exchanges. He 
95 
also played a central role during the Lebanese Syrian negotiations with regards to the 
common economic interests. These negotiations resulted in the fiscal and custom 
separation. Uwayni also played a central role with respect to the agreement of 
Lebanon on extending the oil pipeline named Tapline (Trans-Arabian pipeline) across 
the Lebanese territories. The Syrian parliament had refused this matter, protesting the 
small Syrian share as opposed to allowing the oil pipeline to run across the Syrian 
territories.  
In 1951, Uwayni – through his position as a prime minister and a foreign 
affairs minister – contributed with the Lebanese government to sign the 4-point 
agreement, in which the United States pledged to protect the countries which are 
threatened by communism.  
As per Traboulsi, the comparison between Uwayni and Hariri manifests 
through three levels; firstly both of them belong to economically modest families, and 
they both had Arab nationalist inclinations. They both traveled to Saudi Arabia and 
succeeded through their relationships with the royal family in building a huge fortune, 
which they soon employed in the Lebanese political life.  Secondly, both of them 
obtained the Saudi nationality; Hariri was nicknamed Sheikh and Uwayni Hajj. Both 
succeeded in introducing themselves in the Christian bourgeois club, after they have 
made their fortune abroad. Thirdly, both held the position of prime minister and 
strove through this position to incorporate the Saudi power into the Lebanese political 
life, whether in the economic   or political inclinations.  
 
6.4 Comparison between Hariri and Chiha 
The comparison between Hariri and Michel Chiha coincide with the above mentioned 
comparisons. However, Chiha remains the essential theorizer of the Lebanese system 
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both on the economic and political levels. The similarities between Hariri and Chiha 
are many, despite the differences that might be considered numerous as well.  
 
6.4.1 The personal aspect  
Upon presenting the personal aspect of Hariri, especially his beginnings and 
the way he built his fortune abroad as compared to the beginnings of Chiha, it is 
normal to conclude that both men demonstrate a binary opposition. Hariri seems 
through his resume that he is the closest to Emile Boustany and mostly to Hussein 
Uwayni. This is concluded based on the superficial level. However, if we take into 
consideration the content level we can conclude that Hariri is the actual demonstration 
of Chiha’s concept.  The similarities are evident in Chiha’s vision of the Lebanese 
worker who refuses his social status, leaves his position as an employed person and 
turns into an employer or prefers to immigrate (Chiha,    , 228-229), more specifically 
he is that expatriate “philanthropist” who is able to spend his money in Lebanon. In 
Chiha’s intellectual system, there are no rich people in Lebanon, but rather foreigners 
who spend their money or Lebanese expatriates who return with their money to 
Lebanon.  
 
6.4.2 The identity of Lebanon 
When it comes to the identity of Lebanon, we can enumerate on the direct 
level the differences between Hariri and Chiha, whereas the former was with Arabism 
contrarily to the latter who insisted on the differentiation between the Lebanese and 
Arabian identities. From this perspective, Hariri seems to resemble more Riad Al-
Solh who tried to adapt between Arabism and Lebanonization. Hariri was even one of 
those who assured the Arab identity of Lebanon, which was to be one of the worst 
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nightmares for Chiha, if he was alive today. Nevertheless, if we marginalized the text 
on its direct level, we cannot find anything in Hariri’s path that contradicts with 
Chiha’s definition of the Lebanese identity whether the entity, or the political and 
economic vision.   
On the existential and political level, Hariri did not stray away from the idea 
that considered Lebanon as a country for inter-sharing minorities. He expressed this 
many times through practice and preaching. Some even go further by saying that 
Hariri succeeded in Lebanonizing the Sunni confession through turning them into one 
of the inter-sharing minorities based on the mechanisms that Ta’ef agreement 
specified. He worked on applying this mechanism through connecting the economic   
interests of the Lebanese confessions in a way that would make it hard to stray away 
from Ta’ef (Bkassini, 2009, 62). Sure, this is a deduction that needs to be approved in 
the future. None can guarantee that the Sunni’s of the periphery , who went out in 
hundreds of thousands to the streets in 2005 supporting “the independence uprising” 
after the assassination of Hariri, will still hold on to the motto “Lebanon comes first”, 
which was adopted in 2006 by Saad Hariri whom inherited the political position of his 
father. The Sunni confession, who showed animosity towards Syria after the 
assassination of Hariri, might ask to join with Syria in case the regime there collapsed 
due to the Arab revolutions and was preceded by government controlled by the 
Sunni’s.  
What is certain is that Hariri did not only settle for the concept of 
“Lebanonization” but he rather strove to renew it through re-assuring Chiha’s idea 
that focuses on optimistic morals being the essential support of the Lebanese 
personality. Thus, reconstructing what the civil war had left behind, tells the legend of 
the Phoenician bird that flies from under the ashes. This leads us to the comparison 
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between Hariri and Chiha on the economic   identity level. As such, nothing equals 
the assurance of Chiha on the liberalism of the Lebanese economy, other than Hariri’s 
official and unofficial Statements. According to both Hariri and Chiha, the economic   
identity relies on the geographical location of Lebanon. Exactly as Chiha used to 
repeat, the announcement of Solidere project identifies the location of Lebanon as 
being a link between the civilizations of the ancient world since thousands of years. 
Daoud Al Sayegh was not at all far from this definition of Lebanon as a special entity 
situated on the crossroad of civilizations, religions and continents. (Al-Sayegh, 2011 , 
143). This makes us conclude that the basis that Hariri relied on in his definition of 
Lebanon’s identity was not far from the ones that Chiha adopted on all levels.  
 
6.4.3 The political and administrative vision 
Even though the statements and the writings of Hariri greatly held on to the 
democratic system, the political practice of Hariri affirms that he did not once rebel 
against the “uniqueness” of Lebanon’s special system. He was one of the fiercest 
defenders of the articles 9 and 10 in the Lebanese constitution. He was also one of the 
few politicians who did not tackle the elimination of political sectarianism, whereas 
his demand remained within the limits of the folklore requests of any political leader’s 
agenda. In this respect, Hariri seems to be similar to Michel Chiha although Chiha 
was clearer on his refusal of the elimination of political sectarianism. In my opinion, 
this difference is related to the disparity of the surrounding environment, in addition 
to the difference in the official position between Chiha and Hariri. 
At the power practicing level, Hariri showed a discretionary flexibility in 
dealing with the constitution. On the one hand, he insisted on abiding by the 
constitutional amendments of Ta’ef that shifted the executive authority from the 
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president of the republic to the council of ministers. On the other hand, he was 
flexible on amending the constitution only if it was in his own interest. For example, 
he was behind extending Al Harawi’s mandate, but resisted the extension of Lahoud’s 
mandate. Hariri’s discretionary approach in dealing with the constitution also 
appeared when he accepted to stay loyal to the participatory formula although it 
contradicted the constitutional law. Perhaps, the Troika “novelty” – that governed the 
country for six years – best incarnates this issue. At this point, Hariri differs from 
Chiha in terms of form and content, because the latter held on to the constitution in a 
way that rendered the text quasi-sacred. He opposed the renewal of his brother-in-law 
Bechara El Khoury. He was also very keen on applying the constitution and not the 
national pact, believing that the constitution – unlike the pact – best interprets the 
Lebanese formula.   
With regards to the parliament, the similarity between Hariri and Chiha soon  
re-appear since both of them strove to have a parliament with the legislative stability 
as a main pillar, thus preserving the economic   identity of Lebanon. Both found in the 
parliament a platform where the inter-sharing minorities meet. Some remarks were 
noted that Hariri was part of the political system that worked on the marginalization 
of the Christian figures, preventing them from being presented in parliament, similar 
to the Syrians desire in marginalizing Christian leaders. However in return, we should 
also note that the Lebanese “Consortium” families were always present either in 
Hariri’s electoral lists or other lists supported by Hariri. As such, Michel Pharaon was 
always a candidate on Hariri’s list in Beirut, and Nabil De Freige entered the 
parliament in 2000 running on Hariri’s list, Pierre Helou and afterwards Henri Helou 
won the strong support of Hariri and his allies during the elections. The presence of 
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these families indicates that Hariri did not breach the essential rule, through the core 
Christian representation of the “importers party” in the parliamentary seminar.  
As such, we can conclude that Hariri did not drift from Chiha’s rule. He had 
even similar methods at some point. The same way Banque Pharaon & Chiha 
contributed to getting a big number of candidates to the parliament, Hariri succeeded 
in entering the club of the political “rollers”. This term became famous when 
indicating leader of certain confessions and their ability to get their candidates into the 
parliament. The famous sentence of Hariri “just as it is” (Zay ma hiye) is still stuck in 
the minds of people, and its significance is clear since it shows his ability to get 
anyone to parliament.  
Exactly as Chiha, Hariri differentiated between the legislative position and the 
executive one when it came to sectarian representation. Hariri, at least in his own 
cooperation, was keen on neutralizing the sectarian factor in the executive 
administration. Even when the sectarian rules forced him to appoint people from a 
certain sect for an executive position, he used to be keen on appointing the most 
competent person.  
However, the similarity between Chiha and Hariri does not apply on the 
desired authorities of each for the president of the republic and the prime minister. 
While Chiha adhered to the authorities that made the president a republican king, 
Hariri was very prudent to strictly apply Ta’ef, especially in terms of transferring 
power from the president’s hands to the ministerial council. He even aspired to 
transfer some of the “royal” authorities to the cabinet, including the authority to 
disband the parliament. Yet, this authority was eliminated by Ta’ef accord.  
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6.4.4 The economic vision 
While dissecting Chiha’s discourse, Traboulsi specifies key words in the 
economic discourse. He stops at the following definitions: international road, 
crossroad, station, link, bridge, public market, warehouse, public square, free zone, 
shelter for people and capitals (Traboulsi 1999, 62).  We can find one third of these 
definitions or their likes in one statement of Hariri in 2004 were he stated: “ wants for 
Beirut to become more organized and to become a center for tourism, finance, culture, 
commerce and health, and a point of attraction for different conferences in the region. 
I expect that in ten years it would become the jewel of the Middle East”. It seems 
obvious that the similarity between Rafik Hariri and Michel Chiha reaches its highest 
degrees when it comes to economy. However, this does not mean that there are no 
contrasts between them. Some of these contrasts are even very essential.   
Principle wise, both Chiha and Hariri called for liberal economy and for an 
economic system that relies on the service sector, the geographic location of Lebanon 
as well as on the legislative, fiscal and monetary stability. Chiha assured on backing 
the Lebanese band with gold through purchasing tons of gold via Bank of Lebanon. 
Hariri followed this approach and even inculcated it as an economic   norm that is 
stronger than the law itself. Chiha asked to eliminate the custom obstacles through 
eliminating custom fees and others. Hariri did the same throughout more than one 
stage. Chiha called to reduce the expenses and the revenues of the government and 
transforming the treasury budget to something that is similar to a “deposit”. Hariri 
tried to do the same, whereas his overall idea that focused on reconstructing 
downtown Beirut – Solidere project – worked on bringing back the economic role of 
Lebanon as a center of services. Nevertheless, the legitimate father of this idea is none 
other than Michel Chiha, as previously discussed in more than one instance.  
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Such an economic   role had catastrophic consequences on the agricultural and 
industrial sectors during the days of Chiha and Hariri. Both did not hesitate to neglect 
the importance of the industry arguing that it hardly contributes to the economy. 
Moreover, both did not present any reasonable excuses to justify the negligence of the 
agriculture sector. Accordingly, they both propagated for an economic   vision that 
balance this unbalanced structure by covering the fiscal deficit via attracting “foreign 
capitals” to the Lebanese banks. It is sufficient to say that in 2004, the size of the 
money transfers reached around 4.5 billion USD (Iskandar, 2007, 144), which 
exceeded by 1.5 billion USD  the average national income between the years 92 and 
2006 that was around 3 billion USD (Bkassini 2009, 84). In such an economy, the 
absence of the social welfare government becomes natural, despite the ‘rosy’ 
promises of the ministerial statements. 
Hariri’s investment in the construction sector even if it was similar to Chiha’s 
call for investing in the real estate sector, it also pushed him – whether he liked it or 
not – to breach one of the most prominent rules in Chiha’s system. The difference 
between Chiha and Hariri reveals here on the economic level. Chiha was strict with 
respect to his refusal to get indebted because that would incur costs that the 
government could spare, while Hariri always argued that indebtedness was the 
solution as opposed to waiting for international donations. This indebtedness, despite 
its high interest rates, had contributed to attract more foreign capitals, as well as to 
break more of Chiha’s rules due to the conditions that were imposed by the donating 
countries. These conditions made Hariri’s economic vision clash with Chiha’s in two 
main matters. The first matter is the elimination of the exclusive agencies, based on 
the recommendations of the Paris II conferences. This triggered the rebellion of the 
“consortium” on Hariri, until the latter accepted to leave the ministerial decision 
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words on paper. The second difference is evident in the recommendations emanated 
from the Paris conferences to adopt the value added tax. As known, taxes are disliked 
and not conform to the Lebanese liberal system, which is described by Chiha as one 
of a kind.  
This difference between Chiha’s theory and Hariri’s execution resulted in 
catastrophic consequences. Chiha argued for a government that gets remunerated 
from companies, Hariri’s execution of this theory – due to his reliance on the policy 
of indebtedness – lead to a government that is financially incapable, yet responsible 
for funding the banking system that is achieving huge profits due to the high interest 
rates. In accordance, Chiha called to liberate the government from any economic 
burdens, while Hariri came to liberate the government from its social burdens while 
committing it to banking burdens. This made banks boast in their annual balance 
statement, which exceeded the Lebanese government’s entire national income.  
Despite all this, the common denominators between Hariri and Chiha remain 
present. Most importantly, both dropped the plain from their calculations as a 
geographic asset with its influences on the economic combination. In addition, even if 
they both drastically argued about the importance of economic   freedom, they did not 
show the same enthusiasm towards public and individual freedoms. While Chiha’s 
contributions in this respect were mostly theoretic, Hariri - through his executive 
position and his support to the practices of the Syrian custody – did not place at any 
stance public freedoms at the same level as economic freedoms. In this context, the 
justifications of his consultants that he was forced to do abide by the standards of the 
security regime imposed by the Syrian intelligence, condemn him rather than render 
him innocent. This justification affirms that Hariri agreed on the bargaining between 
public freedoms versus economic freedoms, and thus the latter prevailed. 
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6.4.5 Foreign policy 
If we set aside the relationship of Hariri with Syria, which is a current matter 
that has still not been illustrated in a scientific manner, Hariri’s foreign policy would 
almost be identical what Chiha called for. Of course, Hariri did not go to the extent of 
inviting openly to join with the western allies. However, he always presented himself 
the protector of Lebanon and Syria through his strong foreign relations. As such, he 
always bet on the peace process and the ability of the international society to achieve 
this without resorting to violence. Even after he admitted to the ability of the 
resistance that resulted in the liberation of the South, he still believed that the 
international society should proceed with the peace process.  
Hariri’s vision of the phase following the peace process with Israel is based on 
an economic integration between Arab countries. At this point, Hariri relatively 
differs from Chiha, since the animosity of the latter towards Israel was mainly 
associated with its economic ability. In this context, Hariri’s call for an Arab 
economic integration would not have been necessarily approved by Chiha, since this 
had never been part of his principles. Perhaps Chiha’s position during the negotiations 
on the mutual economic interests between Lebanon and Syria indicates that the man 
would not demonstrate any enthusiasm to Hariri’s idea.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
While Rafik Hariri was launching his reconstruction project for downtown Beirut, 
calling the Lebanese people to be optimistic about the future, the artist Ziad Al 
Rahbani was launching his new play after a long absence, entitled “Lawla Foushat Al 
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Amal” -If it weren’t for hope-, inviting the Lebanese people to be pessimistic about 
the future. Around the same time, Joseph Samaha, then a journalist in Al Hayat, drew 
a parallel between these two visions about the future of Lebanon. Today, as the 
desired future has become the present, or even the past, it is our duty to learn our 
lessons from history. In retrospect, we realize now that the years that followed 
Chiha’s death, the ideologue of the optimistic vision, witnessed two civil wars, one of 
which lasted 15 years. Regardless of the various interpretations of these wars, the 
staunchest defenders of the Lebanese political and economic system cannot ignore the 
role of the latter in fueling these wars. As for Hariri, it was barely three years after his 
assassination, when internal bloody conflicts erupted in the streets of Beirut, due to 
the failure of the' inter-sharing minorities' once again in solving their problems 
through the parliament.  To say the least, this reality clearly shows the dramatic 
failure of the Lebanese formula in overcoming the problems generated by the 
dominant socio-economic system. The most consistent contribution made by this 
formula was the creation of opportunities for the minorities to 'unevenly' steal the 
country's wealth using governmental channels, and luring external intervention to 
defend and/or increase their share when threatened by a real opposition.   
  
The precise focus of this study was not to discuss the reasons that led to the failure 
of the Lebanese system. Nevertheless, since Chiha and Hariri were the main 
contributors in constructing and re-constructing the Lebanese system based on a 
paradoxical combination between economic liberalism/neo-liberalism and socio-
political conservatism, the aim of this thesis was to draw a causal link between 
Chiha's vision of Lebanon as reconstructed by Hariri's discourse and the recurrent 
dramas experienced by Lebanon.   
106 
 
References 
 
 
Abu Zaki, R. (2010). Al wikalat al hasria bakia bakia [Exclusive Agencies still remain], Al-
Akhbar. Retrieved from http://rachabouzaki.blogspot.com/2009/03/blog-post_11.html     
 
Al-Hoss, S. (2001). Lil-hakika wl-tarikhe: Tajareb al-hokm bayn 1998-2000 [For truth and 
history: Governance experience between 1998-2000] (2nd ed). Beirut: Sharikat al-
Matboua’t lil Tawzia’ wl Nasher. 
 
Al Mahdar al sirry al kamel bayn al Hariri wa rostm Ghazaly [The secret report of Hariri and 
Rostom Ghazali last meeting], (2011, September 22). Al Joumhouria, Retrieved from 
http://www.aljoumhouria.com/articles/view/12814/123/ 
 
Al-Sawda, Y. (1967). Fi Sabeel al-Istiklal [For the sake of independence].Beirut: Dar 
Annahar. 
 
Al Sayiegh, D. (2011). Lubnan thawrat al-hourria al-dae’ma: Mohadarat w-mwakef 2005-
2010 [Lebanon is the continuous revolution of freedom: Conferences and statements]. 
Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Al Sayiegh, D. (2002). Lubnan w al-A’lam: Bayn al-Dawr wl-Darorah [Lebanon and the 
world: Role and necessity]. Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Al-Zoa’bi, A. (2006). Rafik al-Hariri: Shahadat fi al-Shahid [Rafik Hariri: Testimonies]. 
Beirut: Dar al-Kalam. 
 
Baydoun, A. (1989). Al-Siraa’ a’la tarikh lubnan [Struggling on Lebanon history]. Beirut: 
Dar Annahar. 
 
Baydoun, A. (2003). Al-Sygha al-mithaq al-dostoor [The Constitution and the concept].  
Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Baydoun, A. (2005). Moghamarat al-moghayarah: Al-loubnanion twae’f w-araban w-
phinikeen [Adventure of differences: The Lebanese people as sects, arabs and 
phoenicians]. Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Bkassini, G. (2009). The road to independence: Five years with Rafik Hariri. Beirut: al-Dar 
al-‘Arabiya lil ‘Ouloum. 
 
107 
Blanford, N. (2006). Killing Mr. Lebanon: The assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact 
on the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Boutros, F. (2009). Fouad Boutros Al-muzakarat [Fouad Boutros memorials]. Beirut: Dar an-
Nahar. 
 
Chiha, M. (1960). Flastine [Palestine]. Beirut: Trident publisher. 
 
Chiha, M. (2004). Fi al-Siyasa al-dakhlieh [Internal Politics]. Beirut: Dar-Annahar. 
 
Chiha, M. (1997). Khwater Vol. 1 [Essays Vol. 1]. Beirut: Dar-Annahar. 
 
Chiha, M. (1997). Khwater Vol. 2 [Essays Vol. 2].Beirut: Dar-Annahar. 
 
Chiha, M. (1957). Politique interieure [Internal politics]. Beirut: Trident publisher. 
 
Chiha, M. (1962). Lubnan fi shakhsiyatihi wa hodorihi [Lebanon in its presence]. Beirut: Al-
Nadwa al-Lubnaniyya 
 
Chiha, M. (1995). Lubnan al-youm [Lebanon Today]. Beirut: Dar-Annahar. 
 
Chiha, M. (1965). Propos d’economie libanais [Lebanon’s Economy]. Beirut: Trident 
publisher. 
 
Corm, G. (1996). Al-la’mar wl-Maslaha al-a’ma: Fi iktisad ma baa’d al-harb w-siyasteh 
[Reconstruction and the public interest: Post war economy and politics]. Beirut: Dar 
al-Jadeed.  
 
Corm, G (2010). Istkmalan liensaf a’hd al raees Lahoud [Defending president Lahoud 
mandate], Al Akhbar. Retrieved from 
http://www.georgescorm.com/personal/download.php?file=akhbar%204%20jan%202
010.pdf 
 
 Corm, G. (2003). Le Liban contemporain – Histoire et societe [Contemporary Lebanon - 
History and society]. Paris: La Decouverte. 
 
Corm, G. (2010). Ma lam toua’lijouho al warka al moukadama ela Paris thlatha [What was 
not discussed in the paper presented to Paris conference three]. Al Akhbar. Retrieved 
from http://www.georgescorm.com/personal/download.php?file=20107.pdf 
 
Dalloul, M. (2009). Rafik al-Hariri, rijal fi rajol, mahattat fi ‘aqdayn min as-sadaqa [Rafik 
Hariri, men in man]. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers Inc. 
 
108 
Dib, K. (2007). ‘Oumara’ al-harb wa tujjar al haykal: Rijal al-sulta wal mal fi Lubnan [Land 
lords and merchants: Men of power and capital]. Beirut: Dar An-nahar. 
 
Harkat al tajdod tahth al hokoma a’la altfawod ma’ almasaref [ Tajadood movement urges the 
government to negotiate the banks], (2001, November 15). Retrieved from 
http://www.tajaddod.org/index.php?id=27&said=17&aid=69&p=320 
 
El-Khazen, F. (1991). The communal pact of national identities. UK: Centre for Lebanese 
Studies. 
 
Gaspard, T. (2004). A political economy of Lebanon 1948-2002: The limits of laissez-faire. 
Netherlands: Brill. 
 
Hariri, R. (1999). Al-hokom wl-masa’olia: Al-khorooj min al-harb wl-dokhool ila al-
moustaqbal [Statesmanship in government: Emerging from war and entering the 
Future]. Beirut: Arab United Press Co.  
 
Hariri, R. (1999). Statesmanship in government: Emerging from war and entering the future. 
Beirut: Arab United Press Co. 
 
Hrawi, E. (2002). ‘Awdat al-Jumhouriya minal douwaylat ila al-dawla [The return of the 
republic from mini states to the state]. Beirut: Dar annahar. 
 
Hamdan, I. (2008). Rafik Hariri w-msharia’ al-haymana al-Iktisadia: Al-mourtakazat al-
tarikhia wl-dinnia l-Almashroua’ al-Moukawm [Rafik Hariri and economic 
hegemony]. Beirut: Rihab Institution. 
 
Hamdan, K. (1998). Al-Azma al-lubnania: Al-twae’f al-deennia al-tabkat al-Ijtima’ia wl-
howwia al-lobnania [The lebanese crises: Religious sects, social classes, lebanese 
identity]. Beirut: Dar al-Farabi.  
 
Hatoum, F. (Producer) (2010). Al-waw al-kafira: Lubnan w souriya [Lebanon and Syria]. 
Documentary Film, Al-Jadeed TV 
 
Hillou, C. (1995). Hayat fi zikrayat [Life in memories]. Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Iskandar, M. (2007). Rafik Hariri w-kadar Loubnan [Rafik Hariri and the fate of Lebanon]. 
Beirut: Dar as-Saqi. 
 
Iskandar, M. (2006). Rafik Hariri and the fate of Lebanon. Beirut: Dar as-Saqi. 
 
Issa, G. (2007). Al-‘alaqaat al-lubnaniya as-souriya [Lebanese and syrian relations].  Beirut: 
Sharikat Matbou’at lil Tawzee’ wal Nashr. 
 
109 
Itani, H. (2007). Hiwayat kathira w-heera wahida: Sirat lobnani [Various identities and one 
dilemma: Lebanese biography]. Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 
 
Khoury, B. (1960). Hakiaek lubnania [Lebanese facts]. Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Majed, Z. (2006). A’n rabih Beirut wl-dawla al-nakisa [About Beirut’s spring and the non 
complete revolution]. Beirut: Dar Annahhar. 
 
Merhej, B. (2004). Hurras al-haykal [The temple’s guard]. Beirut: Riyad al-Rayyess Books. 
 
Murtatda, Y. (2007). Hiwarat sakhina: Min Kamal Junblat ila Rafik al-Hariri/ Mohsen 
Dalloul [Interesting debates: From Kamal Junblat to Rafik Hariri/ Mohsen Dalloul]. 
Beirut: Riad el-Rayes. 
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 7). Beirut: 
Nobilis.  
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 8). Beirut: 
Nobilis. 
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 9). Beirut: 
Nobilis. 
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 10). Beirut: 
Nobilis. 
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 11). Beirut: 
Nobilis.  
  
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 12). Beirut: 
Nobilis.   
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 13). Beirut: 
Nobilis.   
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 14). Beirut: 
Nobilis. 
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 15). Beirut: 
Nobilis.   
 
Njeim, S. (2006). Wsae’k al harb al lubnania [Lebanese war documents] (Vol 16). Beirut: 
Nobilis.   
 
Rais, R. (2005). Al-houllem, al-hakika, wal-khisara  [Dream, reality and loss]. Beirut: Arab 
Scientific Publishers Inc. 
 
110 
Salibi, K. (1988). House of many mansions. California: University of California Press. 
 
Shalaq, F. (2006). Tajribati ma’ Rafik al-Hariri [My experience with Rafik Hariri]. Beirut: 
Arab Scientific Publishers. 
 
Shamoun, K. (1949). Marahil al-Istiklal [Stages of independence]. Beirut: Dar Annahar. 
 
Sharara, W. (2007). Ayam alkatel ala’dy: Min ightial Riad al-Solh ila Rafik al-Hariri [Diaries 
of normal killing: from Riad Solh to Rafik Hariri]. Beirut: Annahar Publishers. 
 
Smaha, J. (1996). Kadaa’ la kadar: Fi akhlak al-jomhoria al-thannia [Destiny not fate: In the 
ethics of the second republic]. Beirut: Dar al-Jadeed. 
 
Tayar al-Moustaqbal. (2001), Barnamej watan [A nation parogram]. Beirut: Future movment. 
 
Traboulsi, F. (2002). A’ks al-sayer: Kitabat moukhtalifa [Against the mainstream: Different 
writings]. Beirut: Riyad el-Rayyes Books. 
 
Traboulsi, F. (1999). Silat bila wasil: Michel Chiha wal ideologiya al-lubnaniyya [Michel 
Chiha and the lebanese ideology]. Beirut: Riyad el-Rayyes Books. 
 
Traboulsi, F. (2007). Tarikh lubnan al-hadith [History of Modern Lebanon]. Beirut: Riyad el-
Rayyes Books. 
 
Traboulsi, F. (2007). Saudi expansion: The lebanese connection 1924–1952. London: London 
University. 
 
Wakim, N. (1998). Al-ayady al-sood [The black hands] (15th ed). Beirut: Sharikat al-
matboua’t lil tawzia’ wl nasher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Personal interview with Daoud Al Sayiegh, political advisor to Rafik Hariri 
 
Personal interview with Ghazi Youssef, economic   advisor to Rafik Hariri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
